Gabriel Tan
Gabriel is a specialist public lawyer, with practice and academic expertise in the field. He read law at Durham University and the University of Oxford.
Gabriel previously practised at Wilson Solicitors, specialising in judicial reviews and civil claims against public authorities. He has experience in public law matters across a wide-range of issues, including policy challenges, and the consultation duties of public authorities, amongst others.
Gabriel has had conduct of litigation before the County Court, Upper Tribunal, the Administrative Court, and the Court of Appeal. He has been instructed by individuals, as well as NGOs, both in litigation and general research matters.
Gabriel writes regularly and has been published across a wide range of publications on various aspects of public law, including academic journals (e.g. Public Law, Edinburgh Law Review), academic blogs (e.g. UK Constitutional Law Association Blog), and practitioners’ publications (e.g. Free Movement).
Gabriel’s academic writing on public law has been cited in parliamentary debates and publications, and by the High Court.
Gabriel also has experience in public law academic research, having been a Research Assistant at Durham Law School working on an empirical project on the duty of candour in judicial review, and the Oxford Law Faculty writing a briefing note on the changes to immigration-related legal challenges by the Illegal Migration Act 2023.
Gabriel is an active commentator on public law on Twitter (@finishedloading) and writes his own blog, the Administrative Court Blog (@admcourtblog), where he provides regular case notes and commentary on Administrative Court decisions."
Practice Area
Panel
- Contributing Author
5 Contributions by Gabriel Tan
PRACTICE NOTES
A1P1 (ECHR) property rights: scope, deprivation versus control, lawful aims, proportionality (Bank Mellat), compensation, positive obligations, and interaction with protest—UK and Strasbourg case law
Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) states
Every natural or legal person has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. No person shall be deprived of their possessions except in the public interest and subject to conditions laid down by law and by the general principles of international law.
The foregoing provision does not in any way limit a state’s right to enact and enforce laws it considers necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the general interest, or to secure the payment of taxes, other contributions, or penalties.
Scope of the Protected Right
The first rule is general in nature and sets out the right to property. The second and third rules represent interferences with that primary right and must be construed in the light of the principles contained within it.
Elements of the Protected Right
There are three rules in A1P1:
The right to the peaceful enjoyment of property
The prohibition on deprivation of property
The right of states to control the use of property...
Public Law
PRACTICE NOTES
Defending threatened or issued judicial review: pre-action protocol, duty of candour, redactions, acknowledgement of service and summary grounds to permission (England and Wales)
This how-to guide outlines, at a high level, what a body carrying out public functions should do when faced with a threatened or lodged judicial review. It focuses on the stages up to the court’s decision on permission. For measures to guard against a successful challenge, see Practice Note: Avoiding a judicial review.
Take legal advice
The extent to which a threatened judicial review has already attracted legal input will differ. It turns on the nature of the impugned decision—major policy is more likely to have been advised upon than a one-off administrative act—and on who the decision-maker is. On receipt of a pre-action letter, the immediate issue is to ask whether any clear flaws exist in the decision under challenge, and, if so, whether these can be communicated to the decision-maker. How far such advice can shape the decision-maker’s approach will vary...
Public Law
PRACTICE NOTES
Judicial review and the Tameside duty: due inquiry, Wednesbury standard, how courts assess compliance, consultation interplay, and contextual intensity
Overview of the Tameside duty
The Tameside duty takes its title from Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC. As Lord Diplock made clear, a decision-maker must frame the right question and take reasonable steps to equip himself with the relevant information in order to answer it correctly before acting. It is most often characterised as a duty to undertake sufficient or due inquiry. For background reading, see: ‘Due Inquiry’: Supperstone, Goudie and Walker on Judicial Review [10.59]...
This obligation is a logical development of the broader, general and long‑standing public law principle that a decision-maker must weigh every relevant consideration, and disregard those that are irrelevant, most notably exemplified by Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation. In this regard, Lord Diplock’s statement of the test in Tameside is firmly anchored in the Wednesbury principle (R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor). It remains distinct from the (mistaken) view that the duty arises from procedural fairness owed to the applicant (R (Plantaganet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice)...
Public Law
PRACTICE NOTES
Judicial review in England and Wales: claimant’s procedural guide from pre-action to permission
This practical overview sets out, at a high level, the procedural actions a claimant ought to take when bringing a judicial review claim. It addresses the process up to the court’s decision on whether to give permission to pursue judicial review. Only the stage up to the court’s determination on whether to grant permission to apply for judicial review is covered.
For the potential grounds and available remedies, see the Practice Notes on this topic: Grounds of judicial review—illegality, Grounds of judicial review—unreasonableness, Grounds of judicial review—procedural impropriety, Grounds of judicial review—breach of legitimate expectation and Remedies in judicial review. Those notes address the bases relied upon and the remedies available therein.
Send a letter before claim and comply with the pre-action protocol
Where a person considers that a body exercising a public function has taken a potentially unlawful decision, one should, if the relevant judicial review time limit permits (discussed further below), prepare a letter to that body setting out the legal grounds of challenge and the outcome sought. The Pre-action Protocol for Judicial Review sets out the required steps, format and content for such correspondence. The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide identifies two reasons why this is important...
Public Law
PRACTICE NOTES
Judicial Review Remedies in England and Wales: Discretion, Key Factors, Quashing (including suspended/prospective), Mandatory and Prohibiting Orders, Declarations, Damages, Injunctions, and the ‘No Substantial Difference’ Test
Overview
Section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (SCA 1981) sets out the remedies available on an application for judicial review which a court may grant. The list includes the following:
quashing orders
mandatory orders
prohibiting orders
declarations
damages (including restitution or recovery of a sum due)
injunctions/interim remedies
Under CPR 54.6, the claimant is required to state, in the claim form, any remedy being sought. By virtue of SCA 1981, s 31(1), the remedies can be claimed in the alternative, or as cumulative options in addition to each other. For further information and discussion, see: Combining prerogative orders: Supperstone, Goudie and Walker on Judicial Review [16.2]. In this context, a conclusion that a judicial review has succeeded is not, as a general rule, sufficient finally to dispose of a claim (see R (LND1) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department at para [61]).
Remedial discretion in judicial review
It is a fundamental principle that public law remedies are discretionary (see R (Imam) v Croydon London Borough Council at para [41]). This discretion arises because public law duties frequently prescribe how a decision-maker should reach decisions, where what the decision-maker does bears upon the interests...
Public Law
If you expected to see yourself on this page, click here.
