Clifford Chance
11 Experts
6 Contributions by Clifford Chance
PRACTICE NOTES
Issuing interim and emergency (urgent) measures
Invoking interim and emergency (urgent) measures is a key means by which national courts and arbitral tribunals can bolster the arbitration process. The term ‘interim and emergency’ embraces a broad spectrum of steps, including injunctions and preservation orders, which, in essence, protect the arbitral process from being undermined by making any award incapable of performance or pointless. The measures or relief a tribunal may grant will be shaped, at least in part, by the arbitration rules (if any) adopted by the parties, and those seeking such orders should be sure of the relevant tribunal’s powers. The law of the seat will also usually be pertinent when defining the extent of those powers. Parties may, and should, also turn to courts with jurisdiction over their arbitration (that is, the courts of the seat) for assistance, either in addition to or in
Arbitration
PRACTICE NOTES
This Practice Note examines the appointment of an arbitral tribunal when an arbitration features multiple parties. For a general overview of multi-party and multi-contract arbitration, see Practice Note: Multi-party and multi-contract arbitration—an introduction.
Tribunal appointments—potential difficulties with multiple parties
In a standard two-party reference, the claimant and the respondent each choose (or propose) one arbitrator, and a party neutral chair (or presiding arbitrator) is then selected. Difficulties may emerge where several claimants or respondents cannot reach consensus on a joint arbitrator to nominate.
Arbitration agreements, appointments and multiple parties
Practitioners handling disputes with multiple claimants and/or multiple respondents must observe any requirements set out in the applicable arbitration rules, the arbitration agreement, and the law of the seat of arbitration. Failure to comply could render the award invalid...
Arbitration
PRECEDENTS
[ Date ]
[ Respondent's Counsel ]
[ Address ]
Dear [ insert organisation name ]
[ Arbitral Institution ] Arbitration [ Arbitration No. ]: [ Claimant ] v. [ Respondent ]—appointment of the sole arbitrator
In accordance with clause [ insert clause ] of the [ arbitration agreement ], we hereby write concerning the appointment of the sole arbitrator. To ensure this process is handled promptly and even-handedly, we suggest the most efficient way forward would be for the parties to reach a joint agreement on a suitable candidate...
Arbitration
PRECEDENTS
Arbitration
[ Dated ] [ Counsel for Respondent ] [ Address ] Dear [ insert organisation name ] [ Arbitral Institution ] [ Number ]: [ Claimant ] versus...
Arbitration
PRECEDENTS
ICC International Court of Arbitration33-43 avenue du Président Wilson75116 ParisFrance
FAO: [ [Insert name of contact at the ICC or the Secretariat of the ICC ] ] [ Insert date ]
Dear [ ICC Court ],
ICC Arbitration No: [ reference ] [ Claimant ] v. [ Respondent ] – request for the appointment of the [ sole arbitrator OR president of the tribunal ]
The Parties have not been able to agree upon the individual to serve as [ the sole arbitrator OR the president of the arbitral tribunal ] in the proceedings referenced above. Relying on [ article 12(3) of the ICC Arbitration Rules OR article 12(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules ], the Claimant respectfully asks the ICC Court to designate the [ sole arbitrator OR president ].
Yours faithfully,
[ Claimant's counsel ]
cc [ Respondent's Counsel ][ Address ]...
Arbitration
PRECEDENTS
[ Insert the arbitrator’s name, address and any reference he/she has requested be used ]
[ By email and by post ]
[ Insert date ]
Dear [ insert name of arbitrator ]
[ Insert name of arbitration ]
Further to our telephone discussion [ earlier today or as appropriate ], when you agreed to take up appointment in this arbitration, we confirm the particulars of that appointment. You are appointed as arbitrator for and on behalf of [ insert name of your client ], in the proposed arbitration with [ insert name of the opposing party ], concerning any and all disputes arising under the parties’ contract dated [ insert date ] (the Contract). The arbitration clause within the Contract states [ insert details ] (the Arbitration Agreement). We are serving notice of your appointment directly on [ insert name of either the opposing party or
Arbitration
4 Contributions by Clifford Chance Experts
PRACTICE NOTES
Executive directors’ shareholding requirements
Ensuring executive directors’ remuneration tracks a company’s long-term strategy and aligns with shareholders’ interests continues to be a prominent and heavily debated issue for UK listed companies across the market. Although no law compels executive directors to hold company shares, imposing a minimum holding, reinforced by a post-employment shareholding policy, has now become the norm across listed companies and is regarded as best practice. The framework for a UK listed company’s shareholding expectations is outlined in the FRC’s Corporate Governance Code (the Code) and in supporting institutional investor guidelines. The primary institutional investor guidelines for these purposes are the Investment Association’s (IA) Principles of Remuneration—usually issued annually ahead of each AGM season (the IA Principles). Neither the Code nor the IA Principles are legally binding, nor do they have the force of law, but they strongly influence
Share Incentives
PRACTICE NOTES
The FCA has, in recent years, acknowledged that weak culture — notably any acceptance of non-financial misconduct — frequently underpins serious conduct breaches across financial services. Consequently, the regulator has sharpened its oversight of non-financial misconduct when supervising firms and individuals. September 2023 saw consultation CP23/20, outlining measures to advance diversity and inclusion and proposing clarifications on how its rules apply to non-financial misconduct. In July 2025, the FCA issued the resulting policy statement alongside CP25/18, detailing its stance on non-financial misconduct. As part of that package, the Code of Conduct (COCON) sourcebook was revised to introduce new non-financial misconduct rules for the sector. The scope of COCON was broadened to bring banks and non-banks into alignment on non-financial misconduct, confirming that for non-banks the rules capture serious bullying, harassment, violence and comparable behaviour directed at a colleague — defined to include fellow
Financial Services
PRACTICE NOTES
This Practice Note has been archived and is no longer maintained.
Background
Premier Oil plc (now Harbour Energy plc) (‘Premier’) is a Scottish-incorporated company listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). It operates as an oil and gas exploration and production business with assets across the UK, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Falkland Islands, Mexico and Brazil. Following Premier’s reverse takeover of Chrysaor Holdings Limited (‘Chrysaor’) on 31 March 2021, Harbour Energy plc became the largest independent oil and gas company listed in the UK.
Premier is well known within the restructuring community, having first restructured in 2017 and later attracting significant media attention when its 2020 attempt to restructure its liabilities did not succeed. Both the 2017 and 2020 debt reorganisations relied on Scottish schemes of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). In 2020, the proposed
Restructuring & Insolvency
PRACTICE NOTES
What is the fixed price certificate scheme?
Sections 32N–32Z2 of the Electricity Act 1989 establish the closure of the Renewables Obligation (RO) and the shift to a fixed price certificate scheme (FPC Scheme). The purpose is to curb exposure to volatile and rising prices for RO certificates (ROCs) across the RO’s final decade, ending in 2037. For additional background on the RO and its closure, see Practice Notes: Renewables Obligation (RO) scheme—key features and The Renewables Obligation Closure and Grace Periods: a consolidated summary [Archived]. The government, in its 2011 energy white paper and subsequent consultations, set out that heightened and more erratic pricing could result because, after the RO closed to new projects in 2017, there is a closed and shrinking pool of capacity as RO‑accredited generators are decommissioned, or until they are no longer entitled to receive
Energy
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