Serle Court
4 Experts
7 Contributions by Serle Court Experts
PRACTICE NOTES
Pre-action investigation and protocol
Who brings proceedings under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986?
All proceedings under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986) are instituted by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade (SoS), within the Department for Business and Trade. As a matter of practice, the Insolvency Service performs the SoS’s functions and duties. Proceedings are commenced either in the SoS’s own name or, in compulsory winding up cases, by the official receiver (OR) acting under the SoS’s direction. Each undertakes the same responsibilities, exercising identical functions for these purposes, and, for convenience, any reference to the SoS in this Practice Note should be read as including the OR. Also note that directors of dissolved companies that have not been through an insolvency process may likewise be disqualified under CDDA 1986, s 6
Restructuring & Insolvency
PRACTICE NOTES
Director disqualification
A number of routes exist for removing a person from office as a director of a limited liability company. Most frequently, this occurs by reason of ‘unfit conduct’ while serving as a director of an insolvent company, pursuant to section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986). That said, further and less commonly used provisions within CDDA 1986 and the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) also permit the disqualification of a company director. Whichever statutory route is relied upon, the effect on the disqualified individual is broadly identical and is explained in more detail in Practice Note: What is prohibited for a disqualified director? By virtue of CDDA 1986, s 7, applications for a disqualification order under s 6 are made either by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade (SoS) or, on the SoS’s
Restructuring & Insolvency
PRACTICE NOTES
ARCHIVED –
This archived practice note sets out information on the EU Damages Directive and captures the position as at its commencement on 27 December 2014. It is not maintained or updated.
After nearly a decade of debate, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers endorsed a new EU directive on private damages actions for breaches of competition law (the Directive).
The Directive received formal adoption on 26 November 2014, following sign-off by the Parliament and Council, and appeared in the Official Journal on 5 December 2014; it took effect on 27 December 2014, with Member States afforded two years from that date to transpose its measures into domestic law.
The Directive is intended to guarantee that anyone suffering loss caused by an infringement of competition law can effectively pursue full compensation.
Its overarching purpose is to tackle obstacles to the effective enforcement of
Competition
PRACTICE NOTES
STOP PRESS :
On 30 April 2026, the European Commission approved an updated Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) together with accompanying Guidelines, supplanting the 2014 framework. The updated TTBER took effect on 1 May 2026. This Practice Note cites the TTBER and the Guidelines and is in the process of being refreshed to mirror these amendments. Finding equilibrium between intellectual property rights (IP/IPRs) and competition law is a longstanding issue. At a glance, the objectives of IPRs and competition law can seem at odds. In broad terms, IPR owners are entitled to govern access to, and seek payment for, exploitation of their exclusive rights. By contrast, competition law pursues open markets and restrains the misuse of market power. The Commission has acknowledged that the interplay of IPRs and competition law can raise concerns and create apparent friction. It has equally
Competition
PRACTICE NOTES
ARCHIVED:
Revised Horizontal Guidelines were published in the Official Journal on 21 July 2023. This Practice Note was produced with the previous Horizontal Guidelines in mind and is no longer maintained. For up to date content, please refer to the relevant section in Practice Note: Analysing horizontal co-operation agreements under EU competition law.
Standardisation (or standard-setting) is widely practised and has a pivotal role across many industries and in society more broadly, delivering clear advantages, such as:
stimulating innovation
assuring product quality and safety
enabling interoperability/compatibility
reducing transaction costs
Agreements on standards primarily seek to establish technical or quality requirements that current or future production processes, methods or products must meet, for instance to ensure compatibility between products designed to work together.
Standardisation agreements may cover a range of matters, including harmonising different grades or sizes of a particular product, or setting
Competition
PRACTICE NOTES
Disclosure
Under the Part 8 route, there is generally no formal, standard obligation to disclose documents. Accordingly, a party to director disqualification proceedings need not give disclosure unless specifically directed to do so, or where the material is cited or identified in their written evidence. If disclosure is sought from the Secretary of State (SoS), that request does not extend to items not in their personal possession, even where such records are held by the insolvency practitioner (IP) or another third party. Any disclosure from those holders must instead be pursued separately and directly from them. In keeping with their duty of fairness, the SoS will, as a matter of course, disclose all that they are able to, and, where available, will always exhibit documentary proof of anything relied upon in their affidavit. If, in the course of an
Restructuring & Insolvency
PRACTICE NOTES
Tying and bundling
Within EU competition law, tying and bundling are chiefly examined as forms of abusive dominance. Article 102(d) TFEU expressly refers to tying, describing it as requiring counterparties to accept supplementary obligations that, by their nature or according to commercial usage, are unconnected with the subject of the contract. Numerous EU investigations have flagged tying and bundling by firms holding market power (i.e., dominance). These include prominent matters in traditional goods and services, and in newer technology markets, exemplified by cases concerning Microsoft’s integration of its media player and browser with its operating system. In recent years, the free provision of digitised, internet-based products and services has increasingly been cast as anti-competitive tying or bundling, particularly in complaints aimed at Google and Meta. This trend has prompted questions over whether the established approach of competition authorities to tying and bundling is
Competition
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