Van Bael & Bellis

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David Hull

Van Bael & Bellis

Johan Van Acker

Van Bael & Bellis

Michael Clancy

Van Bael & Bellis

Samuel Hall

Van Bael & Bellis

2 Contributions by Van Bael & Bellis

Belgian Merger Control: Thresholds, Joint Ventures, Filing, Simplified Procedure, Review Timetables, Fees, Sanctions and Key Developments (2019–2024)
PRACTICE NOTES
Note—to verify if notification thresholds in Belgium and worldwide are triggered, please consult: Where to Notify. 1. Have there been recent developments regarding the Belgian merger control regime? What are the main points of interest and are any further updates/developments expected? Are there any other ‘hot’ merger control issues in Belgium? Belgium first adopted merger control through the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition of 5 August 1991 (the 1991 Act). At inception, the Belgian thresholds combined both turnover and market share criteria. That 1991 framework was superseded by new rules in 1999, and later by the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition of 2006 (the 2006 Act). The 2006 Act delivered significant reforms to merger oversight, most notably because the substantive assessment of concentrations was brought into line with the approach under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR).
Competition
EU merger control and FSR: jurisdictional thresholds, control test, full‑function JVs, referrals, procedure, standstill and penalties (2023–2026 developments)
PRACTICE NOTES
NOTE—to see whether notification thresholds in the EU and throughout the world are met, see further: Where to Notify. 1. Have there been any recent developments regarding and are any updates/developments expected in the coming year? Are there any other ‘hot’ issues? As of 12 January 2023, Regulation 2022/2560 on Foreign Subsidies (FSR) came into force. With this instrument, the Commission aims to tackle potential distortions to competition within the EU arising from significant financial support granted by non-Member States. The FSR imposes compulsory notifications for concentrations and public procurement procedures that cross specified thresholds, and also authorises the Commission to open ex-officio inquiries into foreign subsidies in other settings. For mergers, from 12 October 2023, the FSR requires a separate, standalone filing—on top of any required merger control notification—for deals meeting the following criteria: (i) the target, joint venture, or at least one
Competition

1 Contributions by Van Bael & Bellis Experts

EU competition law in the pharmaceutical sector: market definition, pay-for-delay, pricing abuses, parallel trade, disparagement, regulatory misuse, R&D collaborations, merger control and killer acquisitions
PRACTICE NOTES
This Practice Note This Practice Note explains how EU competition law applies to common practices within the pharmaceutical sector. Given medicines’ vital role in safeguarding public health and the heavy cost they impose on national healthcare systems, the sector consistently faces scrutiny from the European Commission and national competition authorities. Behaviours that threaten patients’ access to innovative, affordable treatments therefore rapidly attract enforcement attention. Historically, the Commission has prioritised cases on ‘Pay-for-delay’/reverse payment patent settlements. The pharmaceutical sector also has features that set it apart: substantial and high-risk investment to bring a therapy to market; multiple decision-makers shaping therapy choices (eg healthcare professionals (HCPs), pricing and reimbursement authorities, insurers and hospitals); pervasive price controls; the central importance of intellectual property (IP) rights; intensive regulation; and pronounced public and political scrutiny. These conditions influence how market incentives and rivalry function in the
EU Law
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