Abuse of dominance meaning

Is there an actionable claim? Note: private competition claims are predominantly governed by national law, and procedural as well as substantive rules differ markedly across the EU; accordingly, when planning competition litigation, assessments will need to be made for each individual jurisdiction. Possible causes of action Assess whether UK competition law has been breached (or EU competition law where the period predates the end of the Brexit transition period). Determine if the loss arises from an agreement or concerted practice between undertakings, particularly between competitors (see further, The prohibition on restrictive agreements). Evaluate whether an undertaking that is arguably dominant—typically indicated by a substantial share of a relevant market—caused the loss through abusive conduct contrary to Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 (and/or Article 102 TFEU if before the end of the Brexit transition period) (see further, The prohibition on abuse of dominance). Consider whether other national or foreign competition laws have...

Competition authorities with jurisdiction in Ireland Competition authorities operating in Ireland, chiefly the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) and, where applicable, the European Commission, possess broad powers to carry out surprise inspections, commonly called ‘dawn raids’. Such raids are a central investigative device for enforcing Irish and EU competition law, particularly in matters involving serious and grave breaches of competition rules like alleged cartel conduct, abuse of dominance, and wage‑fixing arrangements. For companies trading in Ireland, the unannounced arrival of the regulator’s authorised officers at their premises without prior warning can be both highly disruptive and risky. Businesses must be dawn raid‑ready to mitigate disruption and to safeguard their legal entitlements while meeting statutory duties throughout an inspection. This Checklist outlines pragmatic pointers to consider before a dawn raid, including forming a dawn raid response team, alongside key priority steps to take during the on‑site raid, managing legally privileged material, and the follow‑up once the raid has ended. Equipping your organisation with dawn raid readiness know‑how and a...

Market definition is fundamental to the application of competition law. This Checklist helps to determine the relevant market for competition-law purposes and the kinds of evidence that can be used when delineating a relevant market (see further, Market definition and analysis in EU and UK competition law)... Framework for assessment Keep in mind the purpose of defining the market in competition cases. Market definition is not a goal in itself; it is a tool for identifying the strongest and most immediate competitive pressures acting on a firm or firms for the evaluation of market power. Key points to bear in mind when defining and analysing markets are as follows: Consider the context in which the market-definition exercise is undertaken (whether it concerns the assessment of restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance, or mergers)...

Antitrust Commission issues SO to Meta over WhatsApp AI access limits; flags possible interim measures The Commission has delivered a statement of objections to Meta, outlining its preliminary assessment that Meta blocked third-party artificial intelligence (AI) assistants from accessing and engaging with users on WhatsApp, infringing Article 102 TFEU (AT.41034). The Commission considers that Meta’s behaviour risks preventing competitors from entering or growing in the rapidly expanding market for general-purpose AI assistants and has therefore indicated its intention to impose interim measures (subject to Meta’s rights of defence) to avoid serious and irreparable harm to competition. Background On 15 October 2025, Meta announced changes to its WhatsApp Business Solution Terms, effectively prohibiting third-party general-purpose AI assistants from the platform. Consequently, from 15 January 2026, Meta’s own assistant, Meta AI, has been the only AI assistant available on WhatsApp. On 4 December 2025, the Commission opened formal proceedings to examine whether this policy shift amounts to an abuse of dominance. The investigation covers the EEA, excluding Italy, where...

Antitrust The CMA issued a further timetable update for its ongoing Chapter II investigation into Apple’s conduct over app distribution on iOS and iPadOS in the UK, especially the terms and conditions for developers’ access to the App Store—see further, case page The CMA set a further timetable for its Chapter II investigation into Google’s distribution of apps on Android devices (abuse of dominance)—see further, case page NOTE—For all live behavioural investigations before the CMA, see further, UK behavioural investigations—ongoing cases tracker Mergers The CMA published its issues statement for its phase 2 inquiry into AlphaTheta/Serato—see further, issues statement NOTE—For all live mergers before the CMA, see further, UK mergers—ongoing cases tracker Subsidy control The Subsidy Advice Unit released its final report giving advice to the Office for Life Science on its proposed Life Sciences Innovative Manufacturing Fund subsidy scheme for 2025–2030—see further, report NOTE—For all decisions referred under...

Private actions The Court of Appeal has rejected an appeal about the CAT’s approval of litigation funding in a damages claim against Apple, alleging abuse of dominance in the supply of Apple iPhones. The Court of Justice has handed down its judgment in Gutmann v Apple Inc & Ors, concerning an appeal from the CAT on the financing of a collective damages action brought, under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, by Mr Justin Gutmann against Apple Distribution Limited and Apple Retail UK Limited (together, Apple). Background In 2022, Mr Justin Gutmann sought permission to bring collective proceedings, under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, against Apple. Those collective proceedings aggregate stand-alone damages claims under section 47A of the Competition Act, said to arise from alleged infringements by Apple of Article 102 TFEU (before 31 December 2020) and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998...

This table outlines completed CMA, OFT and sectoral regulator investigations from 2013 under Article 102 TFEU/Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998. Only publicly disclosed cases are included. For ongoing behavioural matters, see UK behavioural investigations—ongoing cases tracker. For appeals, see UK competition appeals—ongoing cases tracker. For completed Article 101 TFEU/Chapter I cases, see UK behavioural investigations under Article 101 TFEU/Chapter I Competition Act—closed cases tracker. For instances where the CMA has pursued director disqualification, see UK competition director disqualifications—cases tracker. 2025 Gas transportation — Scotia Gas Networks; Ofgem. Issue: alleged abuse of dominance. Commitments accepted—02/12/2025 Consultation on commitments launched—09/09/2025 Investigation opened—08/03/2024 Vifor Pharma (abuse of dominance) — Vifor Pharma; CMA. Issue: alleged abuse of dominance by making misleading claims about a rival iron treatment. Commitments accepted—23/05/2025 Consultation on commitments launched—10/12/2024 Investigation opened—31/01/2024 2024 ...

Margin squeeze Margin squeeze is a form of exclusionary behaviour aimed at rivals, intended to remove them or undermine their viability—either by driving them from the market or by deterring entry at the outset. Where a vertically integrated firm holds a dominant position in an upstream market for a vital input and also supplies that input to wholesale customers who compete at retail, it can have both the means and the incentive to exclude those competitors from the downstream market. The dominant firm compresses retail rivals’ margins by setting a high wholesale charge, a low retail price, or a mix of the two, thereby narrowing the gap between the cost of essential inputs and the price attainable in the retail market. Consequently, the spread between the dominant undertaking’s retail price for the product or service and the wholesale price it levies on its rivals is insufficient to allow an efficient retail rival to compete effectively. This weakening of effective competition downstream can, in turn, result in higher prices, diminished...

This table sets out all concluded inquiries by Luxembourg’s competition regulator (Conseil de la Concurrence Grand Duché de Luxembourg—the Commission) into suspected cartels, restrictive agreements, and misuse of dominance (Articles 101/102 TFEU and national equivalents) since 2018. Note—only inquiries that are publicly disclosed are included in this table for now...

Behaviour red flags are situations that should prompt you to probe further. Though they can be hard to spot, many scenarios can indicate the presence of anti-competitive conduct. This awareness tool highlights potential competition law warning signs, indicators, traits or behaviours to be especially alert to at all times. Even a single red flag may suggest anti-competitive conduct. 1 Cartel behaviour Any attempt to fix prices. Any attempt to engage in bid-rigging. ...

We are strong but fair competitors We pursue competition with energy while upholding integrity and complying with all relevant competition laws. These laws exist to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour, and to preserve effective competition. Competition laws forbid 'restraints of trade', covering certain kinds of agreements or conduct involving rivals, customers or suppliers, and can also apply to a single undertaking with a dominant market position...

1 What is dominance? 1.1 As a general guide, a firm that persistently holds above 40% of the market on a consistent basis is usually regarded as being in a dominant position. Typically, that level must be sustained for at least two consecutive years. Yet market share alone is not decisive; a company is dominant if, to a meaningful degree, it can operate independently of rivals, customers and consumers within the relevant market, rather than being constrained by them. 1.2 An organisation in a dominant position bears a ‘special responsibility’ to avoid behaviour that harms effective competition. Failing to live up to that duty may expose the business to allegations of abusing a dominant position. Identifying what amounts to abuse is not always straightforward or clear-cut. 2 Why market dominance is a concern 2.1 Dominant firms carry a special responsibility to make sure their actions do not skew or distort competition. 2.2 Such companies should routinely review their behaviour against that responsibility and question the...