Arising basis meaning

Original News Anderson v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 0565 (TC) What was the case about? In his tax return, Mr Anderson sought £3m of relief under sections 64 and 72 ITA 2007, claiming losses from trading activities labelled ‘football development’. He had put funds into the Bafana soccer academy in South Africa, created to cultivate emerging football talent and generate income through the profitable transfer of successful players. HMRC issued a discovery assessment, asserting the losses did not stem from a trade conducted on a commercial basis with a view to profit, and that the predominant purpose of the activity was to secure a tax advantage. Why did the appellant dispute the validity of the discovery assessment? The appellant’s central challenge was that there had been no ‘discovery’. At the point the assessment was raised, HMRC, he said, lacked reasonable grounds to believe Mr Anderson had been under-assessed, as it did not possess adequate information to support such a conclusion at the relevant time. In particular, the...

Original news Mr Y (CAS-57893-P0C6)—20 August 2025 / Ms R (CAS-58612-P1X1)—18 July 2025 Summary The Pensions Ombudsman dismissed a complaint concerning a loan note investment. The scheme’s independent trustee bore no responsibility for losses arising from this high-risk, speculative asset. The complainants had completed forms confirming the trustee was not giving investment advice and could not be held accountable for any investment loss. The arrangement ran on an execution-only basis. The trustee also undertook appropriate due diligence before proceeding. In light of these factors, no liability ultimately attached to the trustee for the loan note loss. The determination highlights the perils of placing funds into non-standard investments. Accordingly, the complaint failed. What were the facts? Ms R and Mr Y were members of the Westerby Pension Scheme (the Scheme). The Scheme was a self-directed, self-invested personal pension (SIPP) scheme. Westerby Trustee Services Limited (Westerby) was the Scheme’s independent trustee and administrator...

Alaska Airlines Inc v Virgin Aviation TM Ltd and another company [2025] EWHC 2505 (Comm) What are the practical implications of this case? The principal outcomes of Mr Justice Foxton’s analysis can be stated as follows: Where an unjust enrichment claim founded on failure of basis is invoked to stop payment of a contractual amount, the correct characterisation is that this engages the defence of circuity of action (para [49]). In that scenario, circuity of action does not mean the debt is never due; rather, it supplies a defence to liability. A broadly drafted no set off clause captures such a defence, so summary judgment can be granted (para [52]). To reach those conclusions, Foxton J reviewed a range of authorities in which no set off provisions were relied upon (see especially para [47]), and he also considered and clarified other decisions relevant to the underlying issues of principle. Accordingly, a debtor cannot avoid a summary determination merely by pointing to...

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note is archived and not kept up to date. Practical implications of West Tankers In short, the current position arising from the West Tankers saga (so far) is: Any EU Member State court seised of proceedings must rule on its own jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Under Brussels I and Brussels I (recast), courts of another Member State cannot remove that competence from it. An arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to award damages for breach of an obligation to arbitrate. Where jurisdiction is disputed (as it often is), consider advising clients to obtain a standalone final award addressing jurisdiction at the outset, and then seek to have it recognised and enforced by the court (the application would be made under the procedure set out in CPR 62). This should prevent a conflicting court judgment taking precedence, on the basis of issue estoppel. Thereafter, the parties can proceed to the liability and quantum issues within the arbitration. West Tankers—the...

Forthcoming change: Sections 6–7 of the Finance Act 2026 provide that, with effect from 6 April 2027, an individual’s property income will be subject to income tax at the property basic rate of 22%, the property higher rate of 42%, and the property additional rate of 47% for a given tax year. A person’s property income is treated as the highest portion of their income, save where they also have savings and/or dividend income. Where savings and/or dividend income arises, the property income is taken to be the portion of the person’s income that falls immediately before the savings and/or dividend income. FA 2026, Schedule 1, makes consequential amendments to ITA 2007. For these purposes, property income means income that is: chargeable under Chapter 3 of Part 3 of ITTOIA 2005 (profits of a UK property business or an overseas property business) chargeable under Chapter 7 of that Part chargeable under Chapter 8 of that Part chargeable under Chapter 9...

This new starter guide introduces copyright law and signposts further Lexis+® UK materials offering fuller coverage. It is for trainee solicitors and anyone new to copyright. Information on other intellectual property (IP) rights, including additional starter guides, appears in Practice Note: Intellectual property (IP)—new starter guide. Where topics fall outside this guide, consult the two Copyright subtopics: Copyright & associated rights transactions and management Copyright disputes For summaries of these areas, see: Copyright & associated rights—overview and Copyright disputes—overview. The guide also explains how to subscribe to the IP daily and weekly news alerts and how to contact the LexisAsk team. Introductory materials For an introduction to copyright law, see Practice Notes: Copyright—subsistence and qualification Copyright—protectable works Copyright—authorship and ownership Duration of copyright Copyright infringement Copyright—secondary infringement Copyright—permitted acts and defences Protecting copyright—training materials Protecting copyright—training materials comprise template PowerPoint slides that can serve as the basis for...

UPDATE: The CJRS concluded on 30 September 2021. This Precedent has been archived and is no longer supported. For additional details on the extended CJRS, see Practice Note: Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (extended version 1 May to 30 September 2021) [Archived]. [ To be set out on the employer’s headed paper ] [ Date ] Dear [ insert name of employee ], Re: [ insert name of employer ] (the Company) Further to our discussion on [ date ], I outlined that [ the significant decline in our business arising from the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is ongoing OR the Company remains unable to operate in the usual way owing to restrictions implemented by the government in connection with the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic ]. [ Provide details of the impact on the organisation, for example whether operations have ceased altogether, or are continuing on a substantially reduced basis, etc. ]...

1 Introduction This letter serves as a joint instruction addressed to you, as an expert on financial remedy matters arising within divorce proceedings between [ client’s full name ] and [ spouse’s full name ], and is provided for that purpose herein. The instruction is made jointly by [ lead firm preparing letter ], representing [ client’s full name ], together with [ name and address of spouse’s solicitors ], [ telephone number and email of spouse’s solicitors ], acting for [ spouse’s full name ]; your opinion is to be provided independently of both parties at all material times. At the first appointment held on [ date of first appointment ], District Judge [ name ], sitting at the Family Court at [ location ], made the following order: [ insert exact wording from order ]. The parties have consented to your appointment on a joint basis as the single joint expert. The scope of your instructions is defined in the order dated [ date of first appointment...

1 Introduction This letter instructs you to act as the single joint expert in financial remedy proceedings arising from divorce proceedings between [ client’s full name ] and [ spouse’s full name ]. You are jointly instructed by [ lead firm preparing letter ] for [ client’s full name ] and by [ name and address of spouse’s solicitors ], [ telephone number and email of spouse’s solicitors ] on behalf of [ spouse’s full name ], on the basis that your expert opinion will remain independent of both parties. At the First Appointment on [ date of first appointment ], District Judge [ name ], sitting at the Family Court at [ location ], made the following order: [ insert exact wording from order ]. The scope of your instructions is confirmed in the order dated [ date of first appointment order ] and in this letter. 2 Arrangements for preparing the report Should you need to discuss the report, whether on a preliminary basis or...

For guidance on safeguarding confidentiality in the workplace, see Practice Note: Confidential information and trade secrets in employment. For broader support on addressing misconduct, consult the following Practice Notes: Managing conduct Dismissing fairly for conduct reasons Reason for dismissal—conduct Protection from dismissal Under section 152 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A 1992), a dismissal will be automatically unfair if the principal reason for ending employment is that the worker: has taken part in, or intended to take part in, the activities of an independent trade union at an appropriate time has used, or intended to use, trade union services at an appropriate time For these purposes, ‘an appropriate time’ is: a time outside the worker’s normal working hours, or a time during working hours when the employer has agreed they may engage in union activities or make use of union services The...

When a defendant defeats a claim, the default position is that the claimant must meet the defendant’s legal costs arising from the claim. Yet CPR 44.2(1)(a) gives the court freedom to decide if, and by whom, costs should be paid. In proceedings with multiple defendants, that discretion allows the court to order an unsuccessful co-defendant, instead of the claimant, to bear the successful defendant’s costs in such circumstances as appropriate...