Block trade meaning

This Checklist highlights the key matters to consider when preparing new Research and Development (R&D) agreements, or revising existing R&D agreements, to determine whether they fall within the block exemption available under the Competition Act 1998 (Research and Development Agreements Block Exemption) Order 2022 (UK R&D BEO), SI 2022/1271. It is not a full guide to the UK R&D BEO, but is intended for situations where a commercial lawyer wishes to be confident that an R&D agreement sits within the UK R&D BEO and aligns with the CMA Guidance on Horizontal Agreements (2023 Horizontal Guidance). Introduction to the UK R&D BEO Any agreement that influences trade or restricts competition in the UK may fall under the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements in Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 1998) (the Chapter I prohibition)...

This Checklist summarises the key considerations when preparing new vertical agreements, or revising existing ones, to determine whether they benefit from the block exemption in The Competition Act 1998 (Vertical Agreements Block Exemption) Order 2022, SI 2022/516 (UK VABEO). It is not a full exposition of UK VABEO, but a tool for commercial lawyers to check that a vertical arrangement falls within UK VABEO (together with any accompanying guidance). For more detail, refer to: CMA Guidance: UK VABEO. A flowchart appears at the end of this Checklist, outlining the principal steps for assessing whether an agreement is covered by UK VABEO. Introduction to UK VABEO Agreements that affect trade and limit competition in the UK may fall within the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements contained in Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 1998)...

This checklist outlines the key matters to weigh when preparing fresh vertical agreements, or revising current ones, to determine whether they qualify for the block exemption under Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/720, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022 (VBER 2022), together with the 2022 Vertical Guidelines. It is not a full manual to VBER 2022; rather, it serves where a commercial lawyer seeks confirmation that a vertical arrangement sits within VBER 2022 (and any guidance released pursuant to it). Introduction to EU VBER 2022 Any arrangement that influences trade or limits competition within the EU can fall under the ban on anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1) TFEU. That said, an agreement is not barred if it either: qualifies for an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, or falls within an applicable block exemption Before 1 June 2022, the pertinent block exemption for vertical arrangements was set out in Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010, the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2010 (VBER...

In this edition: UK antitrust EU antitrust EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation EU State aid Daily and weekly news alerts LexTalk®Competition: a Lexis®Nexis community New and updated content Caselex UK antitrust Public Transport Ticketing Schemes Block Exemption: CMA launches consultation on proposed recommendations The CMA has opened a consultation on its provisional recommendation to advise the Secretary of State for Business and Trade that the Competition Act 1998 (Public Transport Ticketing Schemes Block Exemption) Order (the Order) should remain in force beyond its current term as a continuing block exemption. This follows an April 2024 call for inputs on the Order. First brought into effect in 2001, the Order removes specified integrated ticketing arrangements—agreed between transport operators—from the scope of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act, and it was most recently extended in 2016. The block exemption offers transport operators greater legal certainty to develop and provide ticketing schemes that enable passengers to purchase...

In this issue: UK Competition Policy UK private actions UK Subsidy control EU State aid Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Caselex UK Competition Policy Caselex UK Competition Policy Doug Gurr appointed as interim Chair of CMA following resignation of Marcus Bokkerink The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and the CMA published a joint press release confirming that the Secretary of State for Business and Trade has accepted the resignation of CMA Chair Marcus Bokkerink and named Doug Gurr as interim Chair. The release explains that the move followed a meeting between the Business Secretary and the Chancellor and senior regulators, who were urged to ‘tear down the barriers hindering business and refocus their efforts on promoting growth’. Gurr’s temporary appointment is described as being ‘in a bid to boost growth and support the economy’. Bokkerink embarked on a five-year term as CMA Chair in September 2022. Gurr currently serves as Director...

Antitrust CMA launches consultation on replacement of TTBER; proposes new UK block exemption order The CMA has opened consultation on a draft recommendation to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade (SoS) concerning the replacement of the assimilated Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (Assimilated TTBER), which will lapse on 30 April 2026...

A key proposition underpinning UK competition law Rival undertakings are expected to pursue their strategies independently in the marketplace. In general, head-to-head rivalry should deliver maximum consumer benefit and allocate resources most efficiently. As a result, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) treats with caution any arrangement liable to soften competition or lessen the commercial uncertainty that would otherwise separate competitors. Nonetheless, businesses may have sound reasons for entering agreements whose clauses or obligations risk constraining competition. That is particularly true where such arrangements are intended to create or advance beneficial outcomes (efficiencies) that would not materialise without the restriction included in the agreement. UK competition policy aims to balance safeguarding effective competition (notably by outlawing illegitimate collusion) against securing advantages that arise-and are often only attainable-through co-operation. Chapter I sets out the legal framework for this balanced appraisal, weighing the restrictive features introduced by co-ordination alongside any pro-competitive efficiencies an agreement brings-benefits that may, in turn, offset identified appreciable restrictive effects. Although the focus of this Practice Note...

Vertical agreements Under section 2(1) of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98), vertical agreements are banned. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC Act) has revised the language in section 2 so that, in specified situations, it captures arrangements carried out beyond the UK. The prohibition covers agreements between undertakings, concerted practices, and decisions of associations of undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK, or any part of it, and which may influence trade in the UK or a part of it where such agreements, decisions or practices are implemented, or intended to be implemented, in the UK. In all other instances, the ban extends to conduct likely to have an immediate, substantial and foreseeable impact on trade within the UK or a part of the UK. In addition, section 2(3) CA 98 requires that an agreement is implemented, or intended to be implemented, in the UK. As indicated above, the DMCC Act adjusts the scope...

This Practice Note offers direction on how UK competition law applies to digital markets. It examines: the reach of the Chapter I prohibition in digital trade, including competition law concerns with horizontal and vertical arrangements; abuse of dominance by online platforms; UK market studies and market investigations concerning digital markets; and reforms brought in by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA 2024). It underscores both the benefits and the difficulties of maintaining competition law compliance across the digital commerce lifecycle. This applies at every stage and touchpoint in practice today. Introduction to competition law and digital trading Over recent decades, the manner in which traders buy and sell goods has changed dramatically. As the internet and other forms of digital connectivity become embedded within society, traders are ever more dependent on digital platforms to transact with business customers and consumers. Traders can now reach customers via numerous platforms, including social media, online marketplaces, and virtual reality platforms. This evolution has expanded audience reach and improved...