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Collective dominance meaning

What does Collective dominance mean?
In competition law practice, collective dominance describes two or more independent undertakings which, together, hold market power equivalent to a single dominant firm and can behave to a significant extent as one. It is not a standalone offence; rather, abuse of dominance by one or more undertakings of such a position is prohibited. In the UK this arises under section 18 of the Competition Act 1998. In Ireland it arises under article 102 TFEU and section 5 of the Competition Act 2002. The concept flows from the statutory words “by one or more undertakings” and has been developed in case law. Collective dominance may stem from close economic links (for example, shareholdings, agreements or joint ventures) or from oligopolistic market conditions (such as concentration and transparency) that enable firms to act as a collective entity without agreement. Practically, it allows the CMA, CCPC and the courts to address exclusionary or exploitative abuses, including excessive pricing, even where no single company is dominant. Usage is broadly consistent across England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland. UK authorities are no longer bound by EU case law but may have regard to it where appropriate (section 60A CA 1998).
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View the related Checklists about Collective dominance

CHECKLISTS
Private competition claims: pre-action strategy and checklist for standalone and follow-on cases, covering liability, jurisdiction, limitation, evidence and quantification, remedies, collective proceedings, costs and funding

Is there an actionable claim? Note: private competition claims are predominantly governed by national law, and procedural as well as substantive rules differ markedly across the EU; accordingly, when planning competition litigation, assessments will need to be made for each individual jurisdiction. Possible causes of action Assess whether UK competition law has been breached (or EU competition law where the period predates the end of the Brexit transition period). Determine if the loss arises from an agreement or concerted practice between undertakings, particularly between competitors (see further, The prohibition on restrictive agreements). Evaluate whether an undertaking that is arguably dominant—typically indicated by a substantial share of a relevant market—caused the loss through abusive conduct contrary to Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 (and/or Article 102 TFEU if before the end of the Brexit transition period) (see further, The prohibition on abuse of dominance). Consider whether other national or foreign competition laws have...

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View the related News about Collective dominance

NEWS
UK competition update: CAT finds Apple abused dominance in App Store collective proceedings; FCA/PSR support consolidating PSR into FCA; CMA mergers; subsidy control appeal—23 October 2025

Private actions CAT issues judgment concerning class action finding Apple abused its dominant position in iOS app distribution and in-app payment services The Competition Appeal Tribunal ruled in Dr Rachael Kent v Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International, a collective claim brought by Dr Rachael Kent against Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International Ltd (together, Apple), alleging breaches of the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 TFEU (before 31 December 2020). The Tribunal found Apple abused its dominant position over app distribution and in-app payment services, breaching Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 TFEU. Background In May 2021, the Class Representative, Dr Rachael Kent, applied to commence collective proceedings under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 against Apple...

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NEWS
UK competition: Court of Appeal confirms CAT can order funders’ fees from class damages in Apple iPhone collective; MAN defendants exit Adur councils’ trucks claim after settlement

Private actions The Court of Appeal has rejected an appeal about the CAT’s approval of litigation funding in a damages claim against Apple, alleging abuse of dominance in the supply of Apple iPhones. The Court of Justice has handed down its judgment in Gutmann v Apple Inc & Ors, concerning an appeal from the CAT on the financing of a collective damages action brought, under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, by Mr Justin Gutmann against Apple Distribution Limited and Apple Retail UK Limited (together, Apple). Background In 2022, Mr Justin Gutmann sought permission to bring collective proceedings, under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, against Apple. Those collective proceedings aggregate stand-alone damages claims under section 47A of the Competition Act, said to arise from alleged infringements by Apple of Article 102 TFEU (before 31 December 2020) and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998...

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NEWS
CAT grants revised CPO against Meta; SAU to assess Transport Scotland Network Support Grant—UK competition and subsidy control round-up (15 February 2024)

Private actions CAT grants revised CPO against Meta for an alleged abuse of dominance The CAT has handed down its judgment in Dr Liza Lovdahl Gormsen v Meta Platforms, Inc and Others, dealing with a renewed application by Dr Lize Lovdahl (the Proposed Class Representative) for a collective proceedings order (CPO) under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, seeking damages from Meta Platforms, Inc, Meta Platforms Ireland Limited and Facebook UK Limited (together, Meta)...

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View the related Practice Notes about Collective dominance

PRACTICE NOTES
EU Merger Control under the EUMR: SIEC Test including CK Telecoms 2023, 2024 Market Definition, Horizontal/Non‑Horizontal Effects, Buyer Power, Efficiencies, Failing Firm, Ancillary Restraints and Joint Ventures

This Practice Note explains how the European Commission (the Commission) undertakes the substantive appraisal of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Where a deal falls within the EUMR, the Commission must decide whether the concentration is compatible with the single market. Under the EUMR, any concentration that brings about a significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) in the internal market, or a substantial part of it, in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, must be declared incompatible with the single market. By contrast, a concentration that does not lead to a SIEC in the internal market, or in a substantial part of it, must be cleared (ie deemed compatible with the single market). The SIEC test The SIEC test was introduced into EU competition law to close a gap identified by the European Courts when assessing the Commission’s attempts to address non‑coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets that at the same time did not trigger either single‑firm or collective dominance (which had originally limited...

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PRACTICE NOTES
Chapter II Prohibition on Abuse of a Dominant Position: UK Market Definition, Single and Collective Dominance, Brexit Divergence, and Exclusionary and Exploitative Abuses - Guidance and Case Law

In the UK, unilateral or ‘dominant’ firm behaviour falls within section 18 of the Competition Act 1998. Section 18(1) of Chapter II provides that conduct by one or more undertakings amounting to abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade within the United Kingdom. the abuse need only have the potential to impact trade within the UK, and the dominant position must exist within the UK (even if the abuse occurs outside the UK) ‘UK’ refers to the United Kingdom or any part of it. There is no requirement that the part be ‘substantial’. Otherwise, the analysis of the applicability of the will mirror Article 102 TFEU, namely: is there a dominant position? This involves defining the market and evaluating the allegedly dominant undertaking’s position in that market, and is the conduct at issue abusive? This Practice Note offers a general overview of the application of the, focussing...

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PRACTICE NOTES
EU competition law and copyright exploitation: Articles 101/102 TFEU, exhaustion, territorial restrictions, geo-blocking, collective management and dominance abuses

What is copyright? Copyright safeguards the author’s original expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. It does not hand the copyright owner a monopoly. Consequently, works that are alike or even identical may lawfully coexist provided they are not unauthorised reproductions. In the EU and the UK, protection arises automatically and requires no registration. In general, copyright protects original: musical, dramatic, literary and artistic works (all of which must be fixed in some form) sound recordings films typographical arrangements of published editions and broadcasts databases (which may fall under a database right or copyright) source code, user code and preparatory design material, and in some cases a user interface, logic, algorithms or programming languages Exhaustion of rights and parallel trade within the EEA Existence v exercise At the heart of the EU’s approach are rules securing the free movement of goods between Member States. Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union...

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