DA meaning

This Procedural Guide Sets out the process under the Debtors Act 1869 (DA 1869), the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, Pt 33, and the Administration of Justice Act 1970 (AJA 1970) for applying for a judgment summons compelling a debtor to attend court where the debtor has, or has had since the date of the order or judgment, the means to meet the defaulted amount, yet refuses or neglects to do so. It provides guidance on eligibility to apply, the criminal standard of proof and evidential requirements, and the debtor’s committal. A judgment summons is a summons that requires a debtor to appear before the court. If it is proved to the court’s satisfaction that the debtor has, or has had since the order or judgment, the means to pay the sum in default, and has refused or neglected, or refuses or neglects, to pay it, the debtor may be committed to prison for up to six weeks, or until prior payment of the amount owing....

This Checklist has been archived and is not maintained. This destination table, largely drawn from the edition first created and issued by the Insolvency Service on its website, shows where provisions in the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 (IR 1986) have been placed within the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, SI 2016/1024 (IR 2016). IR 2016 are, in general terms, derived from IR 1986. That said, one-to-one correspondence is uncommon because IR 2016 are organised differently, use updated drafting, and reflect notable reforms-especially those arising from amendments to primary legislation by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013), the Deregulation Act 2015 (DA 2015), and the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (SBEEA 2015). In addition, information requirements formerly set out in prescribed forms have been moved into the applicable rules as specified content. Finally, IR 2016 aim not to reproduce material found in primary law; rather, they include numerous cross-references to the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) so that users can link particular rules...

Al Sadik (also known as Al Sadek and Sadik) v Sadik [2019] EWHC 2717 (QB); [2019] All ER (D) 116 (Oct) What are the practical implications of this case? This ruling is striking as one of the few authorities to grapple with DA 2013, s 9. It follows Wright v Ver earlier this year, only the second case to squarely address the wording and effect of that provision (see News Analysis: Court rules on operation of section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 (Wright v Ver)). In this dispute, the court examined how DA 2013, s 9 sits alongside CPR Pt 11—asking, in particular, whether a defendant who fails to use CPR Pt 11’s procedure to challenge jurisdiction thereby gives up the right to advance a jurisdictional objection under DA 2013, s 9. The court decided there is no such waiver. It stressed that DA 2013, s 9(2) is expressed in mandatory terms, and a purported ‘waiver’ arising from non-compliance with CPR Pt 11 cannot endow the...

Wright v Ver [2020] EWCA Civ 672 What are the practical implications of this case? This judgment addresses a significant issue under DA 2013, s 9. Section 9(2) states that, where a defendant is domiciled outside the UK, the EU or a Lugano Convention state, the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction only if it can be shown that England and Wales is ‘clearly the most appropriate place to bring an action’ concerning the impugned statement. At first instance, the court refused jurisdiction (see News Analysis: Court rules on operation of section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 (Wright v Ver)) and determined that a two-step approach should be used when deciding whether England and Wales was ‘clearly the most appropriate place’. That approach required evaluating the character of the publication and its reach in each relevant jurisdiction, followed by an assessment of the proof of reputational damage within those jurisdictions, for the purposes of section 9(2) of the 2013 Act specifically. Although the appeal was dismissed and...

Serafin v Malkiewicz and others [2020] UKSC 23 What are the practical implications of this case? Lessons from the unfair trial aspect include guidance for judges and practitioners on engaging with a litigant in person (LIP). Judges owe duties, and lawyers have professional duties to the court. Working with LIPs can be challenging, exasperating and take considerable time—sometimes more so than dealing with overly combative solicitors. Clients may struggle to understand why you appear to ‘assist’ an unrepresented opponent. Yet justice demands that those without representation are treated with politeness and dignity, and are given at least basic assistance and direction to find their way through the court process. Only then can justice truly be achieved for all involved in the process as a whole. On the DA 2013, s 4 defence, the Supreme Court’s judgment sets out principles which, though not strictly determinative of the appeal, are crucial in returning the statutory defence to its proper status. Those principles were crafted to aid future cases, and they...

CASE HUB ARCHIVED This archived case hub captures the position as at the judgment dated 30 April 2020; it is no longer maintained. See further the timeline and related/relevant cases. Case facts Outline Case C‑627/18 Nelson Antunes de Cunha v Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP — a national reference from Portugal seeking clarification on, amongst other matters, whether the limitation period for exercising the power to recover State aid applies (i) solely to relations between the EU and the Member State to which the decision to recover aid is addressed, or (ii) whether it also governs relations between that Member State and the opponent, as the beneficiary of the aid considered incompatible with the Single Market. Latest developments On 30 April 2020, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment, ruling that national limitation periods for the recovery of unlawful State aid cannot be shorter than those under EU law. Parties Nelson Antunes de Cunha (Nelson). Instituto...

Background There are statutory provisions on the notices and statements that must be given on an auditor ceasing to hold office. Section 18 and Schedule 5 of the Deregulation Act 2015 (DA 2015), which came into force on 1 October 2015, introduced a number of changes in relation to auditors, which include the statutory provisions dealing with the notices and statements required on an auditor ceasing to hold office. The amendments have effect in relation to financial years beginning on or after 1 October 2015. For the purpose of the notices and statements required on an auditor ceasing to hold office, DA 2015 amended the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) to make a distinction between public interest companies and non-public interest companies (each being treated slightly differently), rather than the distinction between quoted companies and unquoted companies (again, each being treated slightly differently) which applied before DA 2015 amended the CA 2006...

Defences There are several substantive defences to a defamation action and, since the Defamation Act 2013 (DA 2013), most are now statutory. Multiple defences can be advanced together in answer to a claim. Truth Defamatory statements are presumed to be untrue, and the onus of proving their truth rests with the defendant. Showing that the substance of the defamatory statement is true is a complete defence. The defence formerly known as justification was given statutory effect by DA 2013, s 2; the common law defence was abolished and section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 repealed. Pleading and procedural matters in defamation proceedings are governed by CPR PD 53B, which contains particular requirements for truth defences. CPR PD 53B replaced CPR PD 53 with effect from 1 October 2019 (see News Analyses: 109th practice direction update—July to October 2019 and New rules for media and communications claims from 1 October 2019). It is the substance or essence of the defamatory allegation that needs to be...

In the County Court at [ insert ], under Claim No: [ insert claim number ], between A B as Claimant and X Y as Defendant PARTICULARS OF CLAIM At every relevant time, the Claimant owned and was driving a [ insert make and model of vehicle ], bearing registration [ insert registration number ]. The Defendant likewise was the owner and driver of a [ insert make and model of vehicle ], registration mark [ insert registration number ]. On [ insert date ], the Claimant was lawfully travelling along [ insert street name, town, county ]. Whilst the Claimant continued on that route, the Defendant’s vehicle, approaching from the opposite direction in the other lane, sought to pass a stationary car in that lane and moved across into the Claimant’s lane...

Claim No.: HQ [ insert claim number ] IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING’S BENCH DIVISION ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST PARTIES: (1) [ Insert full name of claimant/first claimant ] (2) [ [ Insert full name of second claimant ] ] [ Claimant OR Claimants ] and [ Insert full name of defendant ] Defendant REPLY Save for the admissions contained within it and any averments expressly accepted below, the [ Claimant joins OR Claimants join ] issue with the Defendant upon his Defence. References to paragraphs are to the Defence. The [ Claimant denies OR Claimants deny ] that the words complained of, in the meanings alleged at paragraph 8.1 of the Defence, are true. Without limiting the breadth of that denial as regards the particulars of truth advanced in support of those imputations, the [ Claimant pleads OR Claimants plead ] as follows: ...

The previous regime does not fall within the amendments brought in by the Deregulation Act 2015 (DA 2015), as set out in sections 33 to 40 (see section 41 of the DA 2015, which sets out the application of DA 2015, sections 33 to 40)...

The changes brought about by the Deregulation Act 2015 Section 21A of the Housing Act 1988 (HA 1988) was introduced by section 38 of the Deregulation Act 2015 (DA 2015), and covers all tenancies created on or after 1 October 2015. Under HA 1988, s 21A, a landlord must satisfy the relevant ‘prescribed requirements’ before a notice can validly be served pursuant to HA 1988, s 21. Those ‘prescribed requirements’ are set out in the Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) Regulations 2015 (Prescribed Requirements Regs 2015), SI 2015/1646. In effect, the new HA 1988, s 21A states that a notice under subsections (1) or (4) of section 21 cannot be given in relation to an assured shorthold tenancy of a dwelling-house in England while the landlord is in breach of a prescribed requirement. It further provides that the matters capable of being prescribed are obligations placed on landlords by any enactment that concern: (a) the state and condition of dwelling-houses and their common parts; (b) the...

This Q&A considers the requirements in order to serve a valid section 21 notice pursuant to the Housing Act 1988 in circumstances where a six-month fixed term tenancy commenced in 2013 and, thereafter, became a statutory periodic tenancy. The obligations to be complied with when giving a section 21 notice to a tenant became markedly more onerous in practice following the coming into force of the Deregulation Act 2015 (DA 2015) together with the Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1646. Notably, DA 2015 stipulates that, for any tenancy starting on or after 1 October 2015 (renewals included), the landlord must supply the tenant with an energy performance certificate and a gas safety certificate before the tenancy begins as a prerequisite. On the face of it, the landlord here arguably appears able to issue a valid section 21 notice, given that the fixed term ended before 2015 and therefore preceded the 2015 requirements...