Dominant position meaning

This checklist summarises the factors relevant to assessing an undertaking’s market power. Such analysis is pertinent not only to mergers but also, for example, to determining whether an undertaking is to be regarded as dominant. Does an undertaking have market power? When evaluating market power, the following should be considered. Not every factor needs to be applied in each instance; ultimately, a case-by-case assessment, grounded in the characteristics of the relevant market, is required. Market position of undertaking and its competitors Calculation of market shares is ordinarily the starting point of any assessment The larger the market share, and the longer it is sustained, the greater the likelihood that the undertaking holds a dominant position 50% market share or more: generally evidence of the existence of a dominant market position 40–50% market share: may indicate market power, but this depends on additional considerations Below 40% market share: dominance is unlikely... ...

Private actions CAT grants CPO in PC games class action The CAT has delivered its judgment in Vicki Shotbolt Class Representative v Valve Corporation, a claim for damages issued by Vicki Shotbolt Class Representative (PCR), under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, against Valve Corporation (Valve), asserting that Valve abused its dominant position, in breach of Article 101 TFEU (up to 31 December 2020) and the Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. Background The claim revolves around Valve’s running of Steam, a prominent digital distribution platform for PC video games, via which titles are almost exclusively supplied in digital form...

Private actions The CAT issued its judgment in Infederation Ltd v Google Inc and Others, on an application by Google LLC, Google Ireland Limited and Google UK Limited (together, Google) seeking to strike out sections of Infederation Limited’s (Foundem) particulars of claim relating to Foundem’s damages case against Google, alleging abuse of a dominant position in the market for online search. The CAT rejected the application, concluding that the proposed amendments amounted to a fresh claim that did not arise from the same, or substantially the same, facts as the original claim and was therefore time‑barred—see further, judgment NOTE—For all live private actions in the UK that have been made public, see further, UK private actions—ongoing cases tracker Upcoming dates—For dates of upcoming UK competition developments, see further, UK Competition calendar ...

Private actions CAT issues judgment concerning class action finding Apple abused its dominant position in iOS app distribution and in-app payment services The Competition Appeal Tribunal ruled in Dr Rachael Kent v Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International, a collective claim brought by Dr Rachael Kent against Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International Ltd (together, Apple), alleging breaches of the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 TFEU (before 31 December 2020). The Tribunal found Apple abused its dominant position over app distribution and in-app payment services, breaching Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 102 TFEU. Background In May 2021, the Class Representative, Dr Rachael Kent, applied to commence collective proceedings under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 against Apple...

This table outlines all concluded investigations by Spain’s competition authority (the National Commission on Markets and Competition—the CNMC) into alleged cartels, anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominance (Articles 101/102 TFEU and national equivalents) since 2018. Note—only investigations made public are included. 2026 Investigations under Article 101 TFEU/Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Act Case name, companies under investigation and industry: Professional hairdressing products • I.C.O.N Issues: Restrictive agreements—price fixing Developments: Infringement decision issued—12/01/2026; fines totalling €1.2m imposed Investigations under Article 102 TFEU/Article 2 of the Spanish Competition Act Case name, companies under investigation and industry: Automotive fuels • Repsol Comercial de Productos Petrolíferos • Solred • Campsa Estaciones de Servicio Issues: Concerns the Repsol Group abused its dominant position through its pricing policy that squeezed the margins of independent low-cost petrol stations Developments: Infringement decision issued—03/02/2026; fines totalling €20.5 imposed 2025 Investigations under Article 101 TFEU/Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Act ...

Margin squeeze Margin squeeze is a form of exclusionary behaviour aimed at rivals, intended to remove them or undermine their viability—either by driving them from the market or by deterring entry at the outset. Where a vertically integrated firm holds a dominant position in an upstream market for a vital input and also supplies that input to wholesale customers who compete at retail, it can have both the means and the incentive to exclude those competitors from the downstream market. The dominant firm compresses retail rivals’ margins by setting a high wholesale charge, a low retail price, or a mix of the two, thereby narrowing the gap between the cost of essential inputs and the price attainable in the retail market. Consequently, the spread between the dominant undertaking’s retail price for the product or service and the wholesale price it levies on its rivals is insufficient to allow an efficient retail rival to compete effectively. This weakening of effective competition downstream can, in turn, result in higher prices, diminished...

This table sets out all completed investigations by Latvia’s competition authority (the Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia—the ‘Competition Council’) into alleged cartels, anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominant positions (Articles 101/102 TFEU and national equivalents) since 2018. Note—only investigations that have been made public are included in this table... 2026 Investigations under Article 101 TFEU/Section 11 of the Competition Law No decisions have yet been issued by the CC under Article 101 TFEU/Section 11 in 2026... 2026 Investigations under Article 102 TFEU/Section 13 of the Competition Law Classified advertising services — SS Issues: SS SIA allegedly abused a dominant position by imposing restrictive terms and curbing access to its online advertising platform Developments: Infringement decision announced—20/03/2026; fines totalling €186,780 imposed Speed camera licences — Burde B.V.

We are strong but fair competitors We pursue competition with energy while upholding integrity and complying with all relevant competition laws. These laws exist to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour, and to preserve effective competition. Competition laws forbid 'restraints of trade', covering certain kinds of agreements or conduct involving rivals, customers or suppliers, and can also apply to a single undertaking with a dominant market position...

1 What is dominance? 1.1 As a general guide, a firm that persistently holds above 40% of the market on a consistent basis is usually regarded as being in a dominant position. Typically, that level must be sustained for at least two consecutive years. Yet market share alone is not decisive; a company is dominant if, to a meaningful degree, it can operate independently of rivals, customers and consumers within the relevant market, rather than being constrained by them. 1.2 An organisation in a dominant position bears a ‘special responsibility’ to avoid behaviour that harms effective competition. Failing to live up to that duty may expose the business to allegations of abusing a dominant position. Identifying what amounts to abuse is not always straightforward or clear-cut. 2 Why market dominance is a concern 2.1 Dominant firms carry a special responsibility to make sure their actions do not skew or distort competition. 2.2 Such companies should routinely review their behaviour against that responsibility and question the...

This Precedent slide deck acts as a learning tool, letting you brief your staff on competition law compliance and your organisation’s internal competition law compliance policies and procedures, ensuring clear understanding across the business. The training resources are adaptable. This training pack is built in PowerPoint, so it cannot be exported into Word directly from this page online. Contents Competition law—what, how and our stance When does it become problematic?...

This query asks whether the owner of the land (the servient owner) on which a septic tank currently sits, and across which a neighbour has acquired prescriptive drainage rights, is entitled to replace that tank with a modern treatment unit, and whether the neighbour benefiting from those rights (the dominant owner) can be obliged to contribute to the costs of installing and maintaining the replacement apparatus. Can the servient owner replace the tank? On the basis that the dominant owner holds a prescriptive right to drain into the septic tank (as stated), the initial issue is the servient owner’s entitlement to substitute the existing septic tank with a contemporary equivalent. Provided the works are organised so that the neighbour’s drainage rights are not hindered to an actionable extent, both during installation and thereafter, there is, in principle, no reason to object to the servient owner upgrading their own installation in this manner...