Ex officio meaning

What are the practical implications of this case? The BGH’s ruling carries notable consequences for the validity of arbitral awards regarding formalities such as signatures. It emphasised that courts must, of their own motion, confirm compliance with all procedural conditions in Section 1059 of ZPO, even where the parties do not raise them. This includes verifying that the arbitrators have signed the award, or that there is a legitimate explanation for any missing signature. A refusal to sign, or a determination that obtaining a signature should be avoided, constitutes a proper reason under Section 1054 (1) sentence 2 of ZPO. An instrument that fails to satisfy these formalities is not an award within the meaning of Section 1059 of ZPO at all, and therefore cannot be the subject of an application to set aside. Consequently, German courts should not demand elaborate justifications when the formal criteria appear fulfilled. By way of example, a brief note on the award stating that a signature could not be obtained is sufficient for...

The statement cautioned that algorithms may enable rivals to exchange competitively sensitive information, fix prices, or co-ordinate on other terms or commercial strategies in breach of competition laws. It has become evident that both the Commission and the CMA are prioritising ex officio cartel enforcement, including by boosting resources and developing new detection and enforcement tools to drive prosecutions for cartel conduct. This article sets out a review of where these jurisdictions’ approaches to cartel enforcement converge and where they differ. In terms of similarities Broaden the definition of what amounts to cartel behaviour Rely less on leniency applications to trigger cartel probes Enhance detection methods Place greater weight on prosecuting obstruction of justice Strengthen communication and co-operation between enforcement bodies Within the EU, the Commission acts as the principal enforcer for cartel offences that span across Member State borders. At the same time, individual Member States retain their own autonomous powers to apply and enforce cartel rules within...

In this issue: Subsidies and countervailing measures Anti-dumping WTO Trade in services Dispute settlement Customs Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Subsidies and countervailing measures European Commission imposes provisional countervailing duties on BEV imports from China The European Commission has introduced provisional countervailing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China, nine months after commencing an ex officio anti-subsidy investigation. The Commission determined that China’s BEV value chain benefits from unfair subsidisation, posing a threat of economic injury to EU BEV manufacturers. The inquiry also assessed the expected effects and implications of these measures on importers, users and consumers of BEVs within the EU. The Commission indicated that any negotiated resolution to the investigation must effectively address the harmful forms of subsidisation identified. See LNB News 08/07/2024 9...

State immunity in the Netherlands—introduction This Practice Note examines how state immunity operates in relation to arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands. For a wider primer on state immunity and arbitration, see Practice Note: State immunity and arbitration—general considerations. For Practice Notes covering state immunity across multiple jurisdictions (including England and Wales), consult our subtopic: State immunity and arbitration—overview. State immunity and arbitration—overview States and state-owned enterprises frequently participate in international commercial dealings. Contracts concluded by states—particularly those with overseas private parties—commonly include arbitration agreements. As a result, states are regular participants in international arbitration. Under Dutch law, two categories of state immunity are recognised: State immunity from jurisdiction (jurisdictional immunity) State immunity from enforcement Jurisdictional immunity is a rule that bars a court or tribunal from exercising authority over claims against the state that enjoys the immunity. Enforcement immunity prevents a court or tribunal from enforcing an award or judgment against assets belonging to that protected state. In the...

NOTE—to check whether notification thresholds in Mexico and worldwide are triggered, see further: Where to Notify. 1. Have there been any recent developments regarding the Mexican merger control regime and are any updates/developments expected in the coming year? Are there any other ‘hot’ merger control issues in Mexico? There have been significant recent changes to the Mexican merger control regime, comprising amendments to the applicable legislation and the establishment of a new competition authority. The governing statute is the Federal Economic Competition Law 2015 (Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, Competition Law 2015), as revised by a reform published in the Official Gazette on 16 July 2025, which came into force on 17 July 2025 (Publicación DOF 16 de julio de 2025 Edición Vespertina, Amendment 2025). Under the Amendment 2025, the National Antitrust Commission (Comisión Nacional Antimonopolio, CNA) is created as the new competition authority, and the powers and functions previously carried out by the Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, COFECE) and the Federal Telecommunications...

NOTE—to see whether notification thresholds in the EU and throughout the world are met, see further: Where to Notify. 1. Have there been any recent developments regarding and are any updates/developments expected in the coming year? Are there any other ‘hot’ issues? As of 12 January 2023, Regulation 2022/2560 on Foreign Subsidies (FSR) came into force. With this instrument, the Commission aims to tackle potential distortions to competition within the EU arising from significant financial support granted by non-Member States. The FSR imposes compulsory notifications for concentrations and public procurement procedures that cross specified thresholds, and also authorises the Commission to open ex-officio inquiries into foreign subsidies in other settings. For mergers, from 12 October 2023, the FSR requires a separate, standalone filing—on top of any required merger control notification—for deals meeting the following criteria: (i) the target, joint venture, or at least one merging party is established in the EU and achieves an aggregate EU turnover of no less than €500m; and (ii) all...