“It really is saving us a huge number of hours over the days, weeks and months. Having more relevant support at hand, not having to draft or review documents them from scratch - it all adds up.”
Southampton FCAccess all documents on Government Construction Strategy
In this issue: Building safety Procurement in construction Arbitration Planning in construction Infrastructure projects Tax for construction lawyers Construction industry news LexTalk®Construction: a Lexis®Nexis community Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Construction trackers Building safety Building liability orders—‘anticipatory’ orders and adjudication decisions (Crest Nicholson v Ardmore) In Crest Nicholson Regeneration Limited v Ardmore Construction Limited [2026] EWHC 789 (TCC), the TCC handed down what seems to be only the second judgment considering an applicant’s right to a building liability order (BLO) under section 130 of the Building Safety Act 2022. The applications arose from a dispute concerning fire safety and other defects at a residential scheme in Portsmouth. The applicants asked the court to grant: (i) ‘anticipatory’ BLOs against multiple defendants, making them jointly and severally liable for any liability the first defendant may ultimately be found to owe under section 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972, or...
Background to NISTA’s formation Bringing the NIC and IPA together tackles the entrenched gap between high-level planning and on-the-ground delivery that has long hindered major infrastructure schemes. This move is backed by strong evidence: the Construction Leadership Council reviewed 20,000 schemes and found that thorough front-end planning cut costs markedly and sped up completion. The NIC’s 2024 report also singled out the split between strategy and execution as a key cause of rising UK infrastructure costs. By merging, government intends to streamline infrastructure development, trim red tape, and strengthen coordination across all facets of delivery. NISTA’s role and potential impact NISTA’s brief goes well beyond tidying up structures. It will act as the focal point for both strategy and delivery, from shaping the ten-year infrastructure plan to advising on private finance and delivery practice. In priority places like the Oxford–Cambridge Growth Corridor, NISTA will plan in the round, weighing infrastructure requirements alongside environmental effects and prospects for economic growth...
In this issue: Public procurement Governance Education Social housing Children's social care Social care Healthcare Local government finance Environmental law and climate change Planning Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Public procurement Damages are an adequate remedy in a procurement dispute despite no sufficiently serious breach (Millbrook Healthcare Ltd v Devon County Council) In Millbrook Healthcare Ltd v Devon County Council, the Technology and Construction Court (TCC) determined that, at the interim stage of a procurement claim, whether a breach is “sufficiently serious” is not directly relevant to the question of adequacy of damages; damages can still be the proper remedy. The TCC reviewed established authorities confirming that damages are available in procurement challenges only where the contracting authority’s breach is “sufficiently serious”, a test grounded in EU law. The issue was recently examined in Braceurself v NHS England, where the TCC held that the “sufficiently serious” assessment...
ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. Last updated April 2016 The Government Construction Strategy (‘the Strategy’) was introduced in May 2011 to overhaul public sector construction procurement by championing efficiency, fostering innovation and stimulating growth across the industry. Its core objective was to cut the cost of government construction by 15–20% before the close of the parliamentary term, aligning with Infrastructure UK’s three‑year Infrastructure Cost Review programme. The government’s One Year On update, issued in July 2012, showed that applying the Strategy’s principles had already delivered savings within the year and reduced whole‑life project costs. On 23 March 2016, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority released the Government Construction Strategy 2016–2020, presented as a continuation of the achievements of the Government Construction Strategy 2011–2015. It recorded £3 billion in efficiency savings between 2011 and 2015. For further details on the 2016–2020 Strategy, see Practice Note: Government Construction Strategy 2016-2020 [Archived]...
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z GC Works A suite of construction contracts produced by the government (by what was then the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions) for building and engineering projects in the public sector. They are no longer updated. General requirements An alternative name for project overhead costs, ie essential expenses incurred during the project that are not directly connected to construction activity (for example, the hire and rental of contractor's premises and general support and supervisory staff costs)...
This Practice Note explores the purpose of a direct agreement in the specific setting of a PFI or PF2 project. It outlines the types of direct agreement commonly provided and explains how such an agreement operates, including the mechanics of step-in rights. It also clarifies the distinction between direct agreements and collateral warranties within PFI and PF2 arrangements. In the 2018 Budget (delivered on 29 October 2018), the government announced it would cease using PF2 for new projects (see News Analysis: Budget 2018—what does it mean for infrastructure and housebuilding?). This approach was confirmed in the National Infrastructure Strategy in 2020. Existing PFI and PF2 projects will nevertheless continue and, given their usual lifespan, are likely to run for many years. What are direct agreements? A direct agreement is a relatively brief tripartite contract. Its primary aim is to enable the beneficiary under that agreement to step into Project Co’s role—either directly or via a nominated substitute—where Project Co has defaulted under the principal project contract to...