Horizontal concentration meaning

In this issue: EU fundamentals Commercial Competition and state aid Corporate Data protection and cybersecurity Free movement, immigration and employment Financial services Environment Insurance and reinsurance IP Life sciences Regulatory TMT International trade LexTalk®EU Law: a Lexis®Nexis community Daily and weekly news alerts Trackers New and updated content EU fundamentals European Commission releases April 2024 infringements package The European Commission has unveiled its April 2024 infringements package, identifying the EU Member States facing action for breaches of obligations under EU law. This round includes letters of formal notice sent to France for incorrect transposition of Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 (the EU Waste Framework Directive); to Austria for failing to properly transpose Directive 2011/92/EU, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU, into national law (the EU Environmental Impact Assessment Directive); and to Lithuania for shortcomings in incorporating Directive (EU) 2015/2193 into domestic...

This Practice Note explains how the European Commission (the Commission) undertakes the substantive appraisal of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Where a deal falls within the EUMR, the Commission must decide whether the concentration is compatible with the single market. Under the EUMR, any concentration that brings about a significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) in the internal market, or a substantial part of it, in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, must be declared incompatible with the single market. By contrast, a concentration that does not lead to a SIEC in the internal market, or in a substantial part of it, must be cleared (ie deemed compatible with the single market). The SIEC test The SIEC test was introduced into EU competition law to close a gap identified by the European Courts when assessing the Commission’s attempts to address non‑coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets that at the same time did not trigger either single‑firm or collective dominance (which had originally limited...

Mergers assessment guidelines The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) may prohibit mergers that qualify for investigation under UK merger control where they are expected to bring about a substantial lessening of competition (SLC). Broadly, there are two categories of merger: horizontal mergers — deals between businesses supplying competing products/services non-horizontal mergers — deals either between firms at different points in the supply chain (vertical mergers), or firms at the same level that do not compete (conglomerate mergers) On 18 March 2021, the CMA updated the way it assesses mergers (the Mergers assessment guidelines) to reflect major economic shifts since its 2010 guidance. In summary, the CMA has: addressed developments in digital markets and responded to recommendations in reports such as the March 2019 Furman Report and the May 2019 Lear Report incorporated case law and the CMA’s experience over the last decade included guidance on how sustainability considerations may feature during merger assessment emphasised...

Note—check Where to Notify to confirm whether notification thresholds in Peru and worldwide are satisfied. 1. Have there been any recent developments regarding the Peruvian merger control regime and are any updates/developments expected in the coming year? Are there any other 'hot' merger control issues in Peru? On 30 December 2020, Peru’s Congress enacted the Merger Control Law 2021 (MCL 2021). Following the publication of supplementary regulations, it entered into force on 14 June 2021. Before this, under the Antitrust and Antioligopoly Law for the Electricity Sector 2009 (as amended) (AAL 2009), Peruvian rules required compulsory pre-notification and clearance solely for vertical or horizontal concentrations within electricity generation, transmission, or distribution. Once the MCL took effect, the AAL and Urgency Decree No 13/2019 were repealed. Among other modifications, the MCL allows the authority to review a concentration ex officio—even where thresholds are not triggered—if there is reasonable evidence that the operation could confer a dominant position on one of the parties in the relevant market or otherwise risk...