Leniency meaning

Flowchart This Flowchart offers a concise reference to decide if an application for a charging order ought to be filed at the Civil National Business Centre (a CNBC case) or submitted somewhere else (a non-CNBC case). For guidance, consult Practice Note: Charging orders—how and where to apply...

In this issue: UK antitrust UK merger control UK digital markets EU Digital Markets Act EU antitrust EU State aid Daily and weekly news alerts Caselex UK antitrust CMA launches consultation on proposed changes to the CMA’s published guidance on applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases The CMA has opened a consultation on proposed revisions to its guidance for leniency and no-action applications in cartel cases. This guidance was first issued by the Office of Fair Trading in 2013 and adopted by the CMA in 2014 (the Current Guidance), together with the supporting quick guides. The Current Guidance sets out comprehensive direction on how the CMA’s leniency policy is applied. The consultation covers amendments to both the Current Guidance and the quick guides, which have now been retitled the Short Guides. The CMA’s leniency policy is central to its approach to deterring anti-competitive behaviour, by underpinning the efficient detection and robust enforcement of...

Antitrust Commission fines České dráhy and ÖBB €48.7m for collective boycott The Commission has adopted an infringement decision against České dráhy (ČD) and Österreichische Bundesbahnen (ÖBB) for conspiring to stop the newcomer RegioJet from obtaining second-hand wagons, thereby curbing competition in the passenger rail market. Penalties amounting to €48.7m were imposed on both companies. As ÖBB cooperated with the Commission under the 2006 Leniency Notice, it benefited from a 45% reduction in its fine. RegioJet entered the long-distance rail passenger market in Czechia in 2011. To challenge ČD and ÖBB, it primarily depended on used coaches. The investigation concluded that, between 2012 and 2016, ČD and ÖBB coordinated to preserve their market position and obstruct RegioJet’s growth both within Czechia and on the cross-border Prague–Vienna route, in breach of Article 101 TFEU. In particular, the two operators aligned their conduct in sales processes for used ÖBB long-distance passenger wagons to stop RegioJet purchasing them. ÖBB’s stock was especially significant for RegioJet due to its quality and modern...

The General Court has partly allowed a challenge to the Commission’s decision on Credit Suisse’s involvement in a spot-trading cartel, cutting the penalty after identifying mistakes in its calculation... It delivered its judgment in Case T-84/22, UBS Group and Others v Commission, brought against the infringement decision that found Credit Suisse had taken part in the foreign exchange spot-trading cartel (AT.40135). The General Court upheld the action in part... Background On 2 December 2021, the Commission announced that five banks had participated in a cartel in the Spot Foreign Exchange (Forex) market for G10 currencies, contrary to Article 101 TFEU: Barclays RBS HSBC UBS Credit Suisse UBS also took part in the cartel but obtained full immunity from fines under the Commission’s leniency policy...

CASE HUB ARCHIVED — reflects the position at 1 April 2025 final decision; not maintained. See further, timeline. Case facts Outline Article 101 TFEU investigation into a cartel involving 15 undertakings and one trade association on end-of-life vehicle recycling (AT.40669). Latest development On 2 April 2025, the Commission issued its infringement decision after 15 car makers and one trade body settled and admitted the cartel. Total fines: €458m. Parties/fines: Stellantis — €74,934,000 (50% leniency) Mitsubishi — €4,150,000 (30% leniency) Ford — €41,462,000 (20% leniency) BMW — €24,587,000 Honda — €5,040,000 Hyundai/Kia — €11,950,000 Jaguar Land Rover/Tata — €1,637,000 Mazda — €5,006,000 (Ford jointly and severally liable (J&S) for €1,034,000) Renault/Nissan — €81,461,000 (50% leniency) Opel — €24,530,000 (50% leniency; GM J&S €13,659,000) GM — €17,075,000 Suzuki — €5,471,000 Toyota — €23,553,000 Volkswagen — €127,696,000 Volvo — €8,890,000 (J&S: Ford €3,901,000; Geely €4,419,000) ACEA — €500,000 ...

CASE HUB ARCHIVED – this archived case hub sets out the position as at the decision of 20 January 2016; it is no longer maintained. See further: timeline, commentary and related/relevant cases Case facts Outline A reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the Italian Consiglio di Stato to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU, aiming to determine the correct approach to the treatment of leniency applications where an undertaking files with both a national competition authority (NCA) and the European Commission—clarifying, amongst other matters, whether, on a proper construction of Article 101 TFEU, Article 4(3) TEU and Article 11 of Regulation No 1/2003, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, it follows that an NCA may not depart from instruments developed and adopted within the European Competition Network (ECN) and, in particular, from the ECN’s Model Leniency Programme without contradicting the Court of Justice’s findings in Pfleiderer. On 20 January 2016, the Court of Justice held that instruments adopted in the ECN framework (including...

European Commission investigations The European Commission (Commission) examines indications or allegations of anti-competitive behaviour by companies that affect more than one EU Member State—for instance, international price-fixing cartels and other collusive practices prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, or situations where a company seems to misuse a dominant position contrary to Article 102 TFEU. Note—criminal action against individuals can be pursued in some Member States, but not by the Commission... Investigations may begin in one of four ways: an implicated party coming forward as a whistleblower, a complaint submitted by a third party, the Commission obtaining market intelligence suggesting a breach of competition law—for example, press reports or informal customer complaints, or the Commission identifying suspected infringements during a sector inquiry (see EU Sector inquiries). Frequently, a company only becomes aware that it is under investigation after the Commission has conducted an unannounced inspection (a ‘dawn raid’) or has sent information requests... Once opened, an investigation follows an established...

Note 1 Lawyers and/or Compliance team members should be present for the entirety of the investigation. If this cannot be arranged, ensure a live phone line is maintained throughout. Note 2 Consider the following when reviewing the warrant: Who is the authorised regulator?...