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Alchaster , Case C‑202/24 What are the practical implications of this case? The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice has delivered a ruling that matters for EU extradition practitioners handling requests from the UK across the EU. The Court made entirely plain its stance on the degree of mutual trust to be extended to the UK: despite 47 years of shared integration, the UK sits outside the Union legal order and, as a result, the relationship is not as exceptional as, for example, Norway. Provisions in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) concerning duties to uphold fundamental rights and legal principles in the ECHR and the Charter (Article 524(2), TCA), and the guarantees provided when executing an arrest warrant (Article 604, TCA), ultimately do not alter that position at all. Member State courts must conduct an independent assessment of any such arrest warrant before executing it, even if an ECHR incompatibility has been discounted. What was the background? A District Judge of the magistrates’ court...
Andrysiewicz (Appellant) v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 23 Background On 23 September 2020, the Circuit Court in Lodz issued a request for the extradition of Ewa Andrysiewicz to Poland so that she could serve a two-year custodial sentence arising from four linked fraud offences committed between 2007 and 2008. That sentence had initially been suspended for five years but was later activated in full after she failed to comply with the suspension conditions. Following her arrest in London on 21 January 2023, Andrysiewicz contested extradition, arguing that her removal would be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). To advance her Article 8 case, she relied on the prospect that, if an application under the Polish Penal Code succeeded, she might not be required to serve the remaining portion of the sentence. The district judge nevertheless ordered her extradition to Poland to serve the two-year term, and...
What are the main proposed provisions and what impact will they have? The contains the following provisions: Clause 1: Mandatory whole life orders Murder attracts a life sentence. The court must either determine a minimum term to be served before release can be considered, or, where the seriousness demands it, rule that release can never occur by imposing a whole life order (WLO). At present, Schedule 21, paragraph 2(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020) identifies categories of murder for which the starting point is a WLO. Clause 1 introduces a statutory duty, consistent with other minimum sentence regimes, to impose a WLO in the most serious instances unless exceptional circumstances justify a different outcome. In addition, Clause 1(2)(b) provides that a murder involving sexual or sadistic conduct triggers that duty to make a WLO; by contrast, the current SA 2020, Schedule 21, paragraph 2(2) captures such sexual or sadistic murders only where there are two or more victims, or where the victim was a child. Consequently,...
Damage to property caused by fire is charged as arson A person who, without lawful excuse, destroys or harms another’s property by fire, intending that outcome or being reckless as to whether it occurs, commits arson under section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (CDA 1971). For guidance on criminal damage generally, see Practice Note: Criminal damage. In R v Booth, the omission of any reference to arson in the particulars led the court to treat the indictment as a nullity. The point was considered again in R v Drayton, where the court held that the allegation must, at the very least, be identified as ‘damage by fire’, ensuring the defendant is in no doubt that fire damage is alleged, an accusation carrying a harsher sentence than straightforward criminal damage. This is because arson attracts sterner penalties than simple criminal damage, by clear comparison. Simple arson, where no risk to life is alleged, is an either-way offence. Where the damage relied upon amounts to ‘significant damage by fire’,...
Once a defendant is found guilty of a criminal offence by a court in England and Wales, the court then considers what sentence should follow. See Practice Notes: Sentencing procedure in the magistrates’ and Crown Courts and Sentencing Code. This Practice Note outlines the purpose and reach of mitigation advanced on behalf of convicted defendants in England and Wales to lessen the sentence imposed by the court... Factors determining sentence Sentencing courts must have regard to any matters that, in the court’s opinion, are relevant in mitigation of sentence. Mitigation covers any element of a case that reduces the seriousness of the sentence to be passed, whether affecting its length or its type. By contrast, aggravating factors are those that increase the severity of the sentence. Before reaching conclusions for the purpose of imposing certain sentences, the court is required to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors linked to the circumstances of the offence and any associated offence. For these purposes, the court should obtain a pre-sentence report...
The principal rules for imposing fines after conviction sit in sections 118–132 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020), also called the Sentencing Code. On conviction, a court may order a monetary penalty in place of, or in addition to, another sentence where the offence allows a fine, and this can occur in either the Crown Court or the magistrates’ court. Any financial penalty must reflect the seriousness of the conduct and may not exceed any statutory maximum attached to the offence. A fine is inappropriate where the gravity of the offence demands immediate custody, and it must not be used where a mandatory sentence applies (for example, life imprisonment for murder). See: A-G’s Reference (No 41 of 1994) (1995) 16 Cr App Rep (S) 792 (not reported by LexisNexis®). Where an offence sets a ceiling for the amount, the court is bound by that cap. Maximum fines Magistrates’ court Certain criminal offences heard in the magistrates’ court have an upper limit on fines prescribed by statute...
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