Monopoly meaning

Mergers The CMA has issued its interim report and potential remedies following the remittal of its phase 2 review into Spreadex Limited’s completed purchase of the B2C business of Sporting Index Limited, and has provisionally identified competition concerns. Spreadex and Sporting Index both offer fixed odds betting and sports spread betting to UK customers. Spreadex also operates in financial spread betting and casino betting. The firms are the only licensed providers of online sports spread betting services, and the CMA concluded that any remaining out-of-market constraints post-merger—such as unlicensed sports spread betting operators, financial spread betting firms, and sports fixed odds betting providers—are weak...

What is the background to the consultation? IP rights confer exclusive monopolies on their owners. Ordinarily, those protections stop others from selling, trading in, or importing products that infringe the monopoly. Exhaustion The principle of exhaustion curbs that exclusivity for items already placed on the market with the rights holder’s consent. Once goods are put on the relevant market with permission, the IP proprietor cannot object to their sale, subsequent dealing, or import. A central issue within exhaustion is identifying the relevant market; by placing goods into that market, the proprietor’s rights are exhausted. This matters especially when considering the entitlement to import products covered by IP rights. Many rights holders aim to command premium prices in high-income territories, yet they also wish to supply lower-income markets that cannot bear such premiums. The difficulty arises when those lower-priced goods reach high-income markets, undercutting authorised channels and eroding profit margins. Unauthorised imports—known as parallel imports because they occur alongside authorised imports—therefore create challenges for rights holders. This focus on market...

Easygroup Ltd v Easy Live (Services) Ltd and others [2024] EWHC 2282 (Ch) What are the practical implications of this case? The practical impact of this ruling centres on whether a likelihood of confusion arises even where the signs are similar and the services are identical or akin. Here, the outcome hinged on the notion that the notional average consumer, on encountering a trader using a sign including the word ‘easy’, would not automatically suppose that another trader using a sign with the same word is linked to the first. This is because such a consumer would not believe that any one business could claim a monopoly over all marks that incorporate the descriptive term ‘easy’. In this dispute, the further elements present in each sign, when combined with the conceptual distinctions between the marks, were enough to allow consumers to recognise that the signs signified different commercial origins. Accordingly, despite similarities and overlaps in the services, the overall impression created by each mark enabled the public to...

NOTE—to verify whether notification thresholds in Sudan and worldwide are satisfied, please kindly consult: Where to Notify. Sudan is likewise a COMESA member, which administers a supra-national merger control regime for mergers. 1. Have there been any recent developments regarding the regime and are any updates/developments expected in the coming year? Are there any other ‘hot’ merger control issues in Sudan? By Decree No. 513 dated 15 November 2020, the Prime Minister established the Council for Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practices (the Council). This body serves as Sudan’s competition authority. At present, it remains unclear whether the team within the Council tasked with merger control is functioning. In 2021, the Council stated that it intended to revise the Regulation of Competition and Prevention of Monopoly Act, 2009 (the Act), so that it aligns with regional conventions. Among the projected changes was the introduction of filing fees for concentrations (i.e. mergers). To date, however, no such amendment has been enacted. We are not aware of any concrete...

CASE HUB ARCHIVED This archived case hub captures the position as at the judgment of 10 July 2014 and is no longer being updated. For further detail, see: timeline, commentary and related/relevant cases. Case facts Outline: An appeal was lodged against the General Court’s judgment dismissing Telefónica’s challenge to the Commission’s 2007 decision imposing a fine of around €151.9m for an alleged margin squeeze contrary to Article 102 TFEU. The Court of Justice handed down its judgment on 10 July 2014. The dispute centres on whether a ‘margin squeeze’ can be found without first establishing the indispensability of the wholesale input(s) concerned. Parties Appellants: Telefónica SA Telefónica de España SAU Other Parties: European Commission France Telecom España SA Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios European Competitive Telecommunications Association Telefónica SA is the holding company of the Telefónica group, formerly the state monopoly in Spain’s telecommunications sector. During the period...

This June 2022 monthly round-up notes the passage of amendments to China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (including adjustments to the merger control regime), as well as the launch of a new consultation on additional proposed amendments to China’s merger control thresholds, the publication of a draft bill in Finland to reduce merger control thresholds, the introduction of revised notification thresholds in Kosovo, and the resumption of the merger control review process in Ukraine... China—amendments passed on Anti-Monopoly Law including in relation to merger; new consultation launched proposing changes to merger control thresholds On 24 June 2022, the 35th meeting of the 13th National People’s Congress Standing Committee approved amendments to the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). In respect of merger control, the principal changes are: higher penalties for gun-jumping. For an unnotified merger that does not raise competition concerns, the maximum fine rises from RMB 500,000 to RMB 5m. Where anti-competitive effects are identified, the cap increases further to up to 10% of the notifying party’s group turnover in...