Outage meaning

Broadstone said that most cyber-insurance offered protection only against losses arising from 'malicious' causes, whereas the outage caused by CrowdStrike was the result of an accident. A mishandled update to the corporate cyber security system meant about 8.5 million Microsoft Windows devices could not start up normally. The 19 July 2024 outage disrupted air travel, financial institutions and thousands of businesses. Medical teams were obliged to turn patients away from doctors’ surgeries...

Uncertainty remains over whether policyholders can make claims on their cyber-insurance policies after the blackout, which was triggered by a Windows update from IT security firm Crowdstrike Holdings Inc. In a notice on its website, Crowdstrike said the problem affected only Windows computers. The company emphasised this was not a security incident or cyber-attack. It also noted the issue had been identified and isolated, and that a fix had been deployed...

In this issue: Practice Compliance outlook Financial sanctions AML, CTF & counter-proliferation financing Other financial crime Data protection Other matters This week’s Practice Compliance updates Daily and weekly news alerts New and refreshed content Practice Compliance forecast Practice Compliance forecast New Practice Compliance forecast as at 23 July 2024 Our latest Practice Compliance forecast (dated 23 July 2024) has now launched. This month we cover: (1) three new Bills unveiled in the King’s Speech on 17 July 2024 — the Digital Information and Smart Data Bill, the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, and the Equality (Race and Disability) Bill; (2) an update on the FCA’s consultation on the handling of PEPs, (3) the results of the SRA consultation on its draft business plan and budget, and (4) the closure of the SRA consultation on reforms to permit it to regulate CILEX members. See News Analysis: New Practice Compliance forecast as at 23 July...

What is operational resilience? This Practice Note outlines the key operational resilience requirements that apply to UK financial services firms. Operational resilience is the capacity of firms, and the financial sector, to prevent, adapt, respond to, recover from, and learn from operational disruption. It goes further than business continuity and disaster recovery and is a strategic priority for regulators around the world. Operational resilience-in-scope firms The summary below sets out the categories of firms within scope of the UK operational resilience regime and the applicable rules and guidance from the PRA, FCA and Bank of England. Banks, building societies, and PRA-designated (ie systemically important) investment firms: PRA/FCA/BoE joint paper: Building operational resilience: Impact tolerances for important business services PRA Policy Statement PS6/21: Operational resilience: Impact tolerances for important business services The Operational Resilience Part of the PRA Rulebook (CRR firms) PRA Supervisory Statement SS1/21: Operational resilience: Impact tolerances for important business services PRA Statement...

Use this FLASHCARD to grasp and remember the key points of the oversight framework for critical ICT providers, including cloud computing service providers, established by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). What are critical ICT service providers? Within DORA, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs — ESMA, EBA and EIOPA) may designate ICT service providers as ‘critical’ for the purposes of DORA by reference to a blend of quantitative and qualitative criteria: the potential systemic effect on the stability, continuity or quality of financial services if the provider were to suffer a large‑scale operational outage or failure to deliver its services, taking into account how many financial entities it supports and the overall asset values of those entities the systemic nature or significance of the dependent financial entities, assessed by reference to how many global systemically important institutions (G‑SIIs) or other systemically important institutions (O‑SIIs) rely on the provider, and also the degree of interdependence between those G‑SIIs or O‑SIIs and other...

1 Introduction Our policy is to ensure that, should our operations be disrupted, we restore full functionality at the earliest opportunity. In pursuing this, we seek to safeguard our employees, clients, and any other stakeholders we engage with. This document sets out the steps we will take in the event of a business disruption. If you have queries or concerns about this plan, please contact [ insert name of appropriate contact here ]. 2 Scope of the Business Continuity Plan (BCP) 2.1 This BCP covers all personnel within [ every business unit OR insert which department(s) or office(s) the plan covers ]. 2.2 Situations that would trigger this plan include: flood; fire; theft; IT outage; communications breakdown (e.g. telephone system); partial or total loss of access to premises; severe weather; loss of critical staff; terrorism; cyber security or cybercrime incident; public health events such as a pandemic; [ [ insert other incident...