Personal injury trust meaning

What are the practical implications of this case? Read v North Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust [2025] EWHC 1603 (KB) carries significance for personal injury practitioners considering QOCS. It clarifies when QOCS can be removed after a claim is struck out. Crucially, the method used to achieve strike out does not, by itself, decide whether QOCS continues. What matters is the substantive basis for the strike out, rather than the procedural pathway taken. As a result, claimants should not assume that QOCS will automatically remain in place where a claim is struck out under CPR 3.4 (2) (c) due to non-compliance with, for instance, an Unless Order... Those acting for claimants must ensure clients understand that the court will undertake a qualitative assessment of the strike out grounds when determining QOCS. For defendants, the decision confirms that a strike out obtained by any procedural route may, depending on the reasons underpinning it, lead to the disapplication of QOCS protection...

PI & Clinical Negligence weekly highlights—15 February 2024 In this issue: Road traffic accidents Clinical negligence Costs Court and the legal profession Other PI and clinical negligence news Daily and weekly news alerts Useful information New Q&As Road traffic accidents Pure economic loss and remoteness In Armstead v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company Ltd [2024] UKSC 6, the Supreme Court held that a bailee’s possessory interest in goods is sufficient to found a claim against a third party whose negligence damages those goods. The appeal succeeded: a car-hirer was entitled to sue the negligent third party in tort to recover the contractual daily loss-of-use sum owed to the vehicle owner (the bailor, hire company) arising from the damage. The court also issued succinct guidance on core principles governing negligence claims for harm to tangible property, and on the limits of remoteness. Further, the Supreme Court confirmed that once a claimant has shown that...

Paul and another v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust and others [2022] EWCA Civ 12 What are the practical implications of this case? Before Paul, pinning down when a claimant could recover for a shocking event was problematic, as two Court of Appeal authorities—Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1792 and Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 194—were difficult to reconcile. In Paul, the Court of Appeal determined that Taylor is controlling and that it requires the shocking event to be linked to the defendant’s breach of duty. That stance produces such manifest unfairness that the Court of Appeal has indicated it is minded to grant permission to appeal. Consequently, any claimant advancing a secondary victim claim affected by Paul would be well advised to defer issuing their...

Introduction It is an unfortunate reality that, in many personal injury matters, particularly those involving the most catastrophic injuries, the injured person has lost or will lose the ability to manage their own affairs. In numerous instances, they also lack the capacity to appoint an attorney to act on their behalf or to set up a personal injury trust themselves. The involvement of the Court of Protection (COP) will usually be required in such situations. The court (either the COP or the court dealing with the personal injury claim) may need to determine whether to approve the creation of a personal injury trust or the appointment of a deputy. It should be emphasised that, even where an Enduring or Lasting Power of Attorney exists, the appointed attorney(s) do not have the authority to create a trust to hold any award without the court hearing the claim granting permission to establish a trust. Such permission would normally be recorded in a court order. Where the injured person has capacity to...

ARCHIVED: This tracker is archived and no longer updated. For an overview of Court of Protection cases from 2025 onwards, see: Court of Protection—table of cases. P, Re (Property & Affairs Deputyship: Jurisdiction) [2024] EWCOP 77 (T2) Court of Protection determines it has jurisdiction to consider whether P’s mother should continue as property and affairs deputy The proceedings related to P, an adult who sustained a brain injury in an accident and had a substantial personal injury claim. His mother had been appointed by the Court of Protection as his property and affairs deputy, and the present decision addressed an application seeking to revoke that appointment. The litigation had been protracted. Earlier, the court permitted ‘closed material’ to be withheld from P’s parents to facilitate capacity assessments; for a summary of that ruling, see here. Despite that step, neither the Official Solicitor nor the court gained clarity about P’s condition or even his location. It was reported that P was now residing in Italy. HHJ Burrows concluded that...

The development of the law Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police has traditionally stood as the principal authority on secondary victim claims. Subsequent jurisprudence after Alcock evolved in a piecemeal way, with decisions that were sometimes inconsistent. The Supreme Court's ruling in Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust has introduced several revisions and offered much-needed certainty for practitioners. Grasping the landscape both before and after Paul matters because the underlying principles have been refined and clarified, though not every element has altered. Accordingly, this Practice Note is arranged into pre-Paul and post-Paul parts. The amendments attributable to Paul are clearly signposted within this Practice Note. For deeper commentary on the judgment, consult News Analysis: Landmark Supreme Court decision on secondary victims (Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust). It must be appreciated that claims by secondary victims form an exception to the general rule that, at common law, one individual has no legal entitlement to compensation concerning the physical integrity or condition of another. As with any exception,...

This TRUST is dated [ date ] Parties [ name ] of [ address ], represented by [ name ] of [ address ] (the Litigation Friend) [ name ] of [ address ] and [ name ] of [ address ] (the Original Trustees) Background The Trust is named [ insert name ] (the Trust). The Trust is created to accept the compensation payable for a personal injury to [ insert name ] (the Beneficiary), who lacks capacity to manage their property and financial affairs under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Following the personal injury, legal proceedings [ under Claim Number [ insert number ] ] were commenced and an order for payment of compensation was made on [ date to be completed once order is made ]...

This trust deed is made on [ date ] Parties [ name ] of [ address ] (the Settlor) [ name ] of [ address ] and [ name ] of [ address ] (the Original Trustees) Background The Trust shall be known as [ insert name ] (the Trust). The Trust is set up to receive the compensation payable in respect of a personal injury to the Settlor. Following that injury, legal proceedings [ under Claim Number [ insert number ] ] were commenced, and on [ date to be completed once order is made ] an order was made for payment of compensation to the Settlor. The Settlor has authorised the transfer of the property described in the Schedule to the Original Trustees. ...

[ IN THE COUNTY COURT AT [ insert ] OR IN THE HIGH COURT ] Claim No: Parties: [ Insert name of Claimant ] Claimant and [ Insert name of Defendant NHS Trust ] Defendant PARTICULARS OF CLAIM This action arises from personal injuries sustained due to clinical negligence. At all material times: The Defendant owned, ran, operated and oversaw the E F Hospital (“the Hospital”) pursuant to the National Health Service Acts, and, through its employees, servants and agents, provided and delivered medical, specialist and other services to patients; The Claimant was and remained a patient of the Defendant. ...

Under general principles of trust law, a beneficiary’s or settlor’s spouse may serve as a trustee of a settlement without any prohibition. More broadly, there are few limits on eligibility for appointment as trustee; any person with capacity in law to hold the legal title to the trust property can be lawfully appointed as a trustee of that property...

A disabled person’s trust A disabled person’s trust benefits from distinctive inheritance tax (IHT) treatment. To access this favourable regime, certain qualifying requirements must be satisfied. Specifically, the trust must be one of the forms authorised by section 89 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984), taking account of subsequent amendments to IHTA 1984, and there must be a qualifying disabled beneficiary. For IHTA 1984 purposes, the criteria a beneficiary must satisfy to be treated as a disabled person are set out in IHTA 1984, s 89(4A), together with Schedule 1A to the Finance Act 2005 (FA 2005), which prescribe the relevant tests and definitions...