Proportionality test meaning

This checklist outlines the regulatory obligations for financial services firms in relation to reverse stress testing. The requirements are located in chapter 7.5 of the Prudential sourcebook for MiFID Investment Firms (MIFIDPRU 7.5) within the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook (where reverse stress testing constitutes part of the internal capital adequacy and risk assessment (ICARA) process) and in the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Part of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) Rulebook... What is reverse stress testing? MiFIDPRU and the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Part provide comparable, though not matching, definitions of reverse stress testing...

R (Sandy) v Home Secretary [2023] EWHC 640 (Admin) What are the practical implications of this case? Applicants should note that broad‑brush claims offer scant assistance in naturalisation applications. The particulars of any asylum claim should be reviewed with care, and material from that period augmented where necessary. The guidance sets an exacting bar for good character, so meticulous attention to its thresholds and the language employed is crucial. Of wider note is Mostyn J’s analysis of why he dismissed the claimant’s striking submission—summarised at paras [43]–[45]—that proportionality, rather than rationality, ought to be the operative test. For the principled foundations of the rationality standard in this sphere, see paras [25]–[33] and [38]–[42]. Ongoing attempts to invoke proportionality are likely to meet a frosty reception from the judiciary. As he remarks at para [47], within judicial review proportionality has insinuated itself like a cuckoo into the common law’s nest of traditional evaluation, laying its continental eggs and tipping out the home‑reared Wednesbury chicks. That path would entail an...

In this issue: Leasing property Transferring property Property development Residential tenancies Key developments and horizon scanning Additional property updates this week Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Trackers New Q&As Leasing property Telecommunications Code—redevelopment In a comprehensive and engaging review of a range of inventive arguments deployed to oppose renewal of a subsisting code agreement under paragraphs 31(4)(a), (c) and (d) of the Electronic Communications Code, the Upper Tribunal in Vodafone Ltd v (1) Icon Tower Infrastructure Ltd (2) AP Wireless II (UK) Ltd [2025] UKUT 00058 (LC) held that the alleged grounds were not established. This update concentrates on grounds 31(4)(c) and (d)—the intention to redevelop—and the paragraph 21 public benefit test. See News Analysis by David Jones and Mark Barley, associate and partner at Womble Bond Dickinson: Telecommunications Code—redevelopment (Vodafone v Icon & AP Wireless). Transferring property Determining the true and ancient limits—why boundary agreements always...

In this issue: Planning policy Planning (Wales) Bill Judicial and statutory review Planning enforcement Buildings and Building Regulations Environmental assessments Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Related Documents Planning policy Five statutory instruments published to implement LURA 2023 plan-making reforms Five statutory instruments have been formally presented to Parliament to deliver the updated plan-making framework brought in by the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 (LURA 2023). The LURA 2023 measures are enacted through legislative changes to the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. These are supported by a suite of regulations, which include the following: —Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 (Commencement No. 11 and Saving and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2026, SI 2026/169, which bring into force most of the overhauls to the plan-making regime in LURA 2023 and, in Schedule 1, provide transitional arrangements and saving provisions...

This month the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) opened a consultation on suggested amendments to its merger-control guidance covering jurisdiction and procedure. CMA launches consultation on proposed changes to its merger control guidance on jurisdiction and procedure On 20 June 2025, the CMA commenced a consultation on updates to its guidance on jurisdiction and procedure (CMA2), as well as to the merger notice template. These proposals seek to embed the authority’s new ‘4P’s’ framework—pace, predictability, process, and proportionality—throughout its mergers process. The package includes: clarifications to how the CMA applies the ‘material influence’ and ‘share of supply’ tests revisions concerning the CMA’s treatment of global mergers changes to pre-notification and the phase 1 merger process, along with amendments to the current merger notice template Clarifications to the CMA’s ‘material influence’ and ‘share of supply’ tests The CMA may claim jurisdiction to examine a deal whenever a purchaser gains ‘material influence’ over the target company. This threshold sits...

ARCHIVED : This Practice Note has been archived as it pre-dates 1 April 2013 and is retained solely to aid understanding of the consultation on reforming conditional fee agreements and other elements of funding and costs in civil litigation. It covers: the Government’s response CFAs After the Event (ATE) insurance Damages-based agreements (DBAs/contingency fees) CPR 36 assessment of costs, including the new proportionality test increased hourly rates for litigants in person The consultation Following Lord Justice Jackson’s report on costs, the Ministry of Justice announced a consultation on reforming conditional fee agreements and other aspects of funding and costs in civil litigation. The consultation closed on Monday 14 February 2011. For further details, see: Reform of civil litigation funding: consultation launched (News, 16 November 2010). The Government's response The Ministry of Justice issued its response in May 2011. In broad terms, the Government accepted Jackson’s key recommendations (with some adjustment). The proposed package begins...

When will the court allow an appeal against a finding of fact? The appeal court will permit an appeal only where the lower court’s decision was: wrong; or unjust due to a serious procedural or other irregularity in the lower court proceedings (CPR 52.21(3)). For more information, see Practice Note: Grounds for appealing and preliminary considerations. Where an appeal seeks to overturn a trial judge’s primary findings of fact, intervention is exceptional. An appellate court will not disturb a first instance judge’s factual conclusion simply because it would have reached a different view (Stocker v Stocker). The higher courts have repeatedly cautioned against interfering with a trial judge’s factual findings unless compelled to do so. That restraint extends not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the assessment of those facts and the inferences properly drawn from them, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Re B (A Child) and by the Court of Appeal in FAGE v Chobani...