SIEC meaning

CASE HUB NOTE—appeal lodged before the Court of Justice in Case C- 376/20 P ARCHIVED This archived case hub records the position as at the judgment of 28 May 2020 and is no longer maintained. For more detail, see the timeline, commentary and related cases. An appeal was lodged before the Court of Justice in Case C‑376/20 P. Case facts Outline Appeal before the General Court against the European Commission’s 2016 decision to block the proposed acquisition of Telefónica Europe plc by Hutchison 3G UK Investments Limited, taken under the EU Merger Regulation (Case M.7612). Latest development On 28 May 2020, the General Court handed down its judgment, upholding the action and annulling the Commission’s prohibition decision. The court set aside the prohibition. The Commission’s analysis of unilateral (non-coordinated) effects contained multiple errors of law and appraisal and did not show, to a sufficiently high degree of probability, that prices would rise markedly. The Commission did not establish that the transaction’s...

NOTE—to check whether notification thresholds in Italy and around the world are met, see: Where to Notify. 1. Have there been any recent developments regarding the Italian merger control regime and are any updates/developments expected in the coming year? Are there any other ‘hot’ merger control issues in Italy? A key recent change to the Italian merger control framework was introduced in 2022, granting the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) the power to examine below-threshold deals. Further, Italian rules have been fine-tuned to align with the principles and provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), a text with EEA relevance (EUMR). Article 16.1 of Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990 (Italian Competition Law, ICL 1990) provides that a concentration must be notified to the ICA prior to implementation where both of the following thresholds—adjusted annually to reflect any increase in the GDP deflator—are satisfied: the combined Italian turnover of...

ARCHIVED – this archived practice note examines the European Commission’s method for evaluating innovation-based rivalry within merger reviews and records the state of play at publication (22 June 2018). It is no longer updated any more. Pursuant to the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission must evaluate the competitive impact of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures (concentrations) that satisfy its jurisdictional thresholds. If the Commission harbours serious doubts as to whether a notified concentration would significantly hinder effective competition, it may launch an in-depth (phase II) inquiry and block the deal, unless the notifying party(ies) propose remedies that dispel its concerns. What amounts to a significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) depends on the circumstances in practice. Although price effects are indeed the Commission’s usual focus for notified transactions in many assessments, recent rulings have turned the spotlight on its assessment of whether notified deals could suppress ‘innovation competition’ to a significant extent. The fullest account to date of the Commission’s appraisal of notified concentrations’ impact on innovation competition appears...