Tying and bundling meaning

Antitrust Microsoft receives SO over abusive tying of Teams The Commission has issued a statement of objections to Microsoft, outlining its preliminary view that the company abused its dominance by bundling Teams, a communications and collaboration service, with productivity applications included within its Office 365 and Microsoft 365 business suites for businesses (AT.40721 and AT.40873)...

Antitrust Commission accepts commitments offered by Microsoft in relation to abusive tying of Teams The Commission has publicly confirmed it decided to accept commitments put forward by Microsoft to tackle concerns that it had abused its dominant position by tying or bundling its communications and collaboration tool, Teams, with its business suites Office 365 and Microsoft 365. By way of context, on 27 July 2023 the Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation, following an initial complaint by Slack Technologies, which was later joined by a complaint from alfaview GmbH. In its preliminary assessment, it concluded that, since at least April 2019, Microsoft abused its dominant position in the market for SaaS productivity applications for professional use by tying Teams to its productivity applications, breaching Article 102 TFEU. To address the Commission’s competition concerns, Microsoft initially proposed a number of commitments. Between 16 May 2025 and 16 June 2025, the Commission market-tested Microsoft’s initial commitments and consulted all interested third parties to assess whether they would...

In this issue: Competition and state aid Data protection and cybersecurity Free movement, immigration and employment Financial services Energy Environment Life sciences Regulatory TMT International trade Daily and weekly news alerts New and updated content Trackers Competition and state aid Commission accepts commitments offered by Microsoft in relation to abusive tying of Teams The European Commission has confirmed it will accept commitments put forward by Microsoft to tackle concerns that it misused a dominant position by linking or bundling its communication and collaboration tool, Teams, with its business suites Office 365 and Microsoft 365. See News Analysis: EU Competition law—daily round-up (12/09/2025). Commission consults on revised tech transfer competition rules and guidelines The Commission has opened a public consultation on draft updates to Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 (Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER)) and its Guidelines. The proposals would extend the market share grace period to three years,...

Tying and bundling Within EU competition law, tying and bundling are chiefly examined as forms of abusive dominance. Article 102(d) TFEU expressly refers to tying, describing it as requiring counterparties to accept supplementary obligations that, by their nature or according to commercial usage, are unconnected with the subject of the contract. Numerous EU investigations have flagged tying and bundling by firms holding market power (i.e., dominance). These include prominent matters in traditional goods and services, and in newer technology markets, exemplified by cases concerning Microsoft’s integration of its media player and browser with its operating system. In recent years, the free provision of digitised, internet-based products and services has increasingly been cast as anti-competitive tying or bundling, particularly in complaints aimed at Google and Meta. This trend has prompted questions over whether the established approach of competition authorities to tying and bundling is well-suited to tackling potential foreclosure concerns in emerging markets...

STOP PRESS : On 30 April 2026, the European Commission approved an updated Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) together with accompanying Guidelines, supplanting the 2014 framework. The updated TTBER took effect on 1 May 2026. This Practice Note cites the TTBER and the Guidelines and is in the process of being refreshed to mirror these amendments. Finding equilibrium between intellectual property rights (IP/IPRs) and competition law is a longstanding issue. At a glance, the objectives of IPRs and competition law can seem at odds. In broad terms, IPR owners are entitled to govern access to, and seek payment for, exploitation of their exclusive rights. By contrast, competition law pursues open markets and restrains the misuse of market power. The Commission has acknowledged that the interplay of IPRs and competition law can raise concerns and create apparent friction. It has equally recognised that they are ultimately complementary, each guiding the other, meaning a careful balance is needed when assessing whether the exercise of IPRs aligns with competition law. Despite...

As offerings become more technologically advanced and include integrated systems and features, assessing whether tying or bundling might be seen as anti-competitive grows more complex. This checklist is designed to help you weigh key competition law considerations before linking or packaging products. Always seek advice from [ insert, eg the legal team ] where indicated below, and if you have any queries or concerns... 1 Products and market Evaluate whether the items proposed for a bundle or tie are genuinely separate products. Can the products being bundled or tied be treated as distinct offerings? Yes — consult [ insert, eg the legal team ], as bundling may adversely affect suppliers of stand‑alone products and thus harm competition No — [Insert comments] Do other organisations in the market use bundling and tying?...

Behaviour red flags are situations that should prompt you to probe further. Though they can be hard to spot, many scenarios can indicate the presence of anti-competitive conduct. This awareness tool highlights potential competition law warning signs, indicators, traits or behaviours to be especially alert to at all times. Even a single red flag may suggest anti-competitive conduct. 1 Cartel behaviour Any attempt to fix prices. Any attempt to engage in bid-rigging. ...

1 What is dominance? 1.1 As a general guide, a firm that persistently holds above 40% of the market on a consistent basis is usually regarded as being in a dominant position. Typically, that level must be sustained for at least two consecutive years. Yet market share alone is not decisive; a company is dominant if, to a meaningful degree, it can operate independently of rivals, customers and consumers within the relevant market, rather than being constrained by them. 1.2 An organisation in a dominant position bears a ‘special responsibility’ to avoid behaviour that harms effective competition. Failing to live up to that duty may expose the business to allegations of abusing a dominant position. Identifying what amounts to abuse is not always straightforward or clear-cut. 2 Why market dominance is a concern 2.1 Dominant firms carry a special responsibility to make sure their actions do not skew or distort competition. 2.2 Such companies should routinely review their behaviour against that responsibility and question the...