Vertical or conglomerate effects (mergers) meaning

This Practice Note explains how the European Commission (the Commission) undertakes the substantive appraisal of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Where a deal falls within the EUMR, the Commission must decide whether the concentration is compatible with the single market. Under the EUMR, any concentration that brings about a significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) in the internal market, or a substantial part of it, in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, must be declared incompatible with the single market. By contrast, a concentration that does not lead to a SIEC in the internal market, or in a substantial part of it, must be cleared (ie deemed compatible with the single market). The SIEC test The SIEC test was introduced into EU competition law to close a gap identified by the European Courts when assessing the Commission’s attempts to address non‑coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets that at the same time did not trigger either single‑firm or collective dominance (which had originally limited...

Mergers assessment guidelines The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) may prohibit mergers that qualify for investigation under UK merger control where they are expected to bring about a substantial lessening of competition (SLC). Broadly, there are two categories of merger: horizontal mergers — deals between businesses supplying competing products/services non-horizontal mergers — deals either between firms at different points in the supply chain (vertical mergers), or firms at the same level that do not compete (conglomerate mergers) On 18 March 2021, the CMA updated the way it assesses mergers (the Mergers assessment guidelines) to reflect major economic shifts since its 2010 guidance. In summary, the CMA has: addressed developments in digital markets and responded to recommendations in reports such as the March 2019 Furman Report and the May 2019 Lear Report incorporated case law and the CMA’s experience over the last decade included guidance on how sustainability considerations may feature during merger assessment emphasised...

This overview records merger matters pulled in for examination by national competition bodies across EU/EEA Member States, even where statutory filing thresholds were not met. It omits deals voluntarily notified by the undertakings. Besides the territories listed below, the following EU/EEA Member States may scrutinise transactions that sit beneath formal notification triggers: Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden. Note—only public cases from 2014 onwards are captured here. 2026 Jurisdiction: Ireland; parties: Uniphar/TouchStore; market: national wholesale pharmaceutical supply, pharmacy software and/or retail pharmacy sectors; competition issues: vertical input-foreclosure risks with conglomerate elements; status: called in—20/03/2026 2025 Jurisdiction: Denmark; parties: OneMed/Kirstine Hardam; market: national ostomy appliances (stoma aids) and related patient care services; competition issues: horizontal unilateral effects and/or the creation or strengthening of a dominant position; status: final outcome—pending; called in—27/08/2025 Jurisdiction: Denmark; parties: Uber/Dantaxi; market: national taxi intermediation services; competition issues: horizontal unilateral effects; status: final outcome—pending; notification submitted—15/09/2025; called in—25/08/2025 Jurisdiction: Norway;...